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Abstract. We propose a novel categorical thinking model (CTM) where the fram-
ing of the decision problem affects how the agent categorizes each product, and the
product’s category affects her evaluation of the product. We show that a number of
prominent models of salience, status quo bias, loss-aversion, inequality aversion, and
present bias all fit under the umbrella of CTM. This suggests categorization as an
underlying mechanism for key departures from the neoclassical model of choice and
an account for diverse sets of evidence that are anomalous from its perspective. We
specialize CTM to provide a behavioral foundation for the salient thinking model of
Bordalo et al. [2013], highlighting its strong predictions and distinctions from other
existing models.
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21. Introduction
Psychologists have long held that knowledge about our environment is organized
into categories, and that this categorization plays a key role in decision making. Cate-
gorization has been used by both humans and animals for thousands of years. As Ashby
& Maddox [2005] write, “All organisms assign objects and events in the environment
to separate classes or categories... Any species lacking this ability would quickly become
extinct.”
Categorization plays a key role in a number of important anomalies for the neo-
classical model of choice. Attributes categorized as losses get higher weight relative
to those categorized as gains [Tversky & Kahneman, 1991]. An object’s most salient
attribute plays a disproportionate role in the agent’s subsequent evaluation [Bordalo
et al., 2013]. Subjects avoid objects they categorize as not-obviously-better-than the
status-quo [Masatlioglu & Ok, 2005]. Agents are less patient when deciding between
dated rewards in the short-term than in the long-term [Strotz, 1955]. Allocations among
members of society are evaluated according to whether inequities are advantageous or
disadvantageous [Fehr & Schmidt, 1999].
This paper proposes and axiomatizes a simple model of the role that categorization
plays in economic decisions. In the Categorical Thinking Model (CTM), a decision
maker (DM) first groups objects together into categories, consciously or unconsciously,
then evaluates each object through the lens of the category to which it belongs. The
model has two key features motivated by psychological evidence. First, categorization is
context-dependent, as summarized by a reference point that may depend on the choice
set. Second, how an object is categorized affects its valuation. Prominent models
of loss-aversion, salience, status quo bias, present bias, and inequality aversion all fit
under the umbrella of CTM. Hence, CTM suggests categorization as an underlying
explanation for many key departures from the neoclassical model in many different
decision-making environments.
3To make our results comparable with previous work, we begin by assuming that a
family of reference-dependent preference relations describe the DM’s choices for each
reference point. Each alternative has a pair of observed attributes, such as price and
quality, height and weight, or size and timing of a reward. In CTM, the context in
which the decision takes place determines a reference point, which in turn divides the
alternatives into categories. Each category has its own utility function, and within a
given category, the DM evaluates the options according to it. Hence, the DM makes
different trade-offs between the attributes when they are differentially categorized. We
show that the DM conforms to CTM if and only if she behaves as a standard DM
when comparing objects categorized the same way. That is, her choices satisfy some
standard axioms, such as acyclicity, and do not depend on the reference point when
restricted to alternatives that belong to the same category.
CTM is a parsimonious approach to incorporating psychological evidence into eco-
nomics. Psychological factors determine how each alternative is perceived, which CTM
captures through different categories. Moreover, they predict how being categorized in
a particular way affects the DM’s choice, which CTM captures through the category’s
utility function. For instance, salience and loss-aversion make distinct predictions about
when a DM puts higher weight on a dimension. The most salient attribute gets more
weight, as does an attribute classified as a loss. Our result shows that CTM closes the
model by requiring that the DM acts consistently within the alternatives categorized
the same way.
Despite its generality, CTM makes testable predictions and excludes certain types
of modeling choices. For instance, a number of models capture salience effects, in-
cluding the salient thinking model [Bordalo et al., 2013] (BGS), Kőszegi & Szeidl
[2013], Bhatia & Golman [2013], Gabaix [2014], and Bushong et al. [2015]. Of these
models, only BGS is a CTM. In other words, even the most general version of BGS
excludes these models, so BGS offers a different method of modeling salience. Our
results highlight trade-offs between the different modeling approaches. For instance,
BGS maintains a stronger consistency condition across reference points than does the
4constant loss aversion of [Tversky & Kahneman, 1991], but the latter, unlike BGS,
satisfies Monotonicity across regions.
We then provide the first complete characterization of the observable choice be-
havior equivalent to the BGS model, clarifying and identifying the nature of the as-
sumptions used in the model. The first crucial step towards understanding the model is
getting a handle on its novel salience function that determines which attribute stands
out for a given reference point. We study the salience function based on a simple obser-
vation: while it influences which attribute is salient, the weight given to each attribute
is independent of its magnitude. This makes BGS a special case of CTM, so our earlier
results allow a characterization.
One key feature of BGS is that the reference point is endogenously determined
by the set of available options. Since the salience of each alternative depends on
the reference point, varying the budget set affects the salience of, and so the DM’s
evaluation of, a given alternative. Our final contribution addresses this challenge by
extending our characterization of CTM to the setting where the reference point is
endogenous. Our primitive is a choice correspondence describing the DM’s choices.
The menu maps to a reference point, such as the average level of each attribute over
alternatives in the set. As long as the reference point varies systematically with the
choice problem, we characterize the properties of the choice correspondence equivalent
to CTM. Specifically, we show that if the DM’s choices obey the natural analogs of
our earlier axioms, then CTM rationalizes her behavior. We apply it to provide a
completely endogenous characterization of the BGS function.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next subsection provides a brief overview of
the relevant psychology literature on categorization. Section 2 introduces CTM and
discusses the models covered under its umbrella. Section 3 axiomatizes CTM and
compares and contrasts the models of riskless choice discussed in Section 2. Section 4
5contains our analysis of the salient thinking model. Section 5 introduces the endoge-
nous reference point setting, and applies our axiomatizations of CTM to it. Section 6
concludes with a discussion of related literature.
1.1. Psychology of Categorization. There is a long literature in psychology and
marketing discussing categorization. Recent review articles include Ashby & Maddox
[2005], Loken [2006], Loken et al. [2008] and Cosmides & Tooby [2013]. Much of
the literature focuses on how categories are formed, and when new alternatives are
added into existing categories. CTM relies on several properties documented by this
literature.
First, categories are context dependent. Tversky [1977], Tversky & Gati [1978]
present evidence that replacing one item in a set of objects can drastically alter how
people categorize the remaining objects. Tversky & Gati [1978] argue that categoriza-
tion “is generally not invariant with respect to changes in context or frame of reference.”
For example, they show that subjects put East Germany and West Germany into the
same category when the salient feature is geography or cultural background, but catego-
rize the two differently if political system is salient. Similarly, Choi & Kim [2016] posit
that depending on the context an Apple Watch can be categorized as a tech product,
a fashion product, a fitness product, or a simple watch. Ratneshwar & Shocker [1991]
show that subjects categorize ice cream and cookies together in terms of similarity (e.g.
they are both desserts), but categorize ice cream and hot dogs together in terms of
usage benefit (e.g. both are good snacks to have at the pool). Stewart et al. [2002]
present evidence that relative magnitude information, derived from a comparison of
the reference point, is used in categorization of sounds.
Second, how an object is categorized affects its final valuation. In a classic series
of experiments, Rosch [1975] shows that differently categorized but physically identical
stimuli are perceptually encoded as distinct objects. Wanke et al. [1999] demonstrate
that “wine” is evaluated more positively when categorized with “lobster” than with
“cigarettes.” Mogilner et al. [2008] show that categorizing goods differently resulted
6in different reported satisfaction. Chernev [2011] shows that bundling a healthy food
item with a junk food item reduced the reported caloric content beyond that of the
junk food alone.
Finally, categories take the form of regions in the alternative space. This tracks
very closely with the decision bound theory in the psychology. As Ashby & Maddox
[2005, p. 152] describe, it posits that the subject “partition[s] the stimulus space into
response regions... determines which region the percept is in, and then emits the associ-
ated response.” Ashby & Gott [1988] show it can accommodate examples incompatible
with other theories of category formation, such as prototype theory. Moreover, there is
substantial experimental support for it, including Ashby & Waldron [1999], Anderson
[1991], Love et al. [2004].
2. Model
To aid in comparison with the existing literature and to separate the effects of
reference point formation, we follow Tversky & Kahneman [1991] by taking as given
a family of reference-dependent preference relations. We assume that the space of
alternatives is X = Rn++, focusing on n = 2 when not otherwise noted.1 We often
use the convention of writing x as (xi, x−i) with x−i denoting the components of x
different for i. The next subsections explore three different interpretations of X in
different contexts: as a riskless object with different attributes, as a dated reward or
consumption stream, and as an allocation of consumption across individuals. For each
reference point r ∈ X, the DM maximizes a complete and transitive preference relation,
denoted by %r, over X. As usual, r denotes strict preference and ∼r indifference. The
primitive of the model is a family of such preferences indexed by the set of reference
points, {%r}r∈X . In this section, we assume that the reference point is exogenously
1 We note when there is a distinction between general n and n = 2. Theorem 5 and the results
that rely on it use the full structure of Rn++. The remaining results all generalize to any X that is a
finite Cartesian product of open, linearly ordered, separable, connected sets endowed with the order
topology, where X itself has the product topology.
7given. We relax this assumption in Section 5 to allow endogenous reference point
formation.
2.1. Categorical Thinking Model. The first ingredient of the model is a mapping
from the reference r to categories. Each category corresponds to a different psycholog-
ical treatment and changes as the reference changes. We allow the categories to have
a very general structure.
Definition 1. A vector-valued function K = (K1, K2, . . . , Km) is a category function
if each Kk : X → 2X satisfies the following properties:
(1) Kk(r) is a non-empty, regular open set, and cl(Kk(r)) is connected,2
(2) ⋃mk=1Kk(r) is dense,
(3) Kk(r)⋂K l(r) = ∅ for all k 6= l, and
(4) Kk(·) is continuous.3
Categories arise from the psychology of the phenomenon to be modeled. For CTM
to be applicable, the psychology must make an unambiguous prediction about which
alternatives are affected. For instance, with gain-loss utility, alternatives that dominate
the reference point are treated differently than those better in only one dimension.
Similarly, with present-bias, alternatives that pay-off sooner than the reference are
categorized together. While we take the categories as given, if the psychology only
makes partial predictions, then the categorization of other alternatives can often be
inferred from choice. Proposition 1 does so for the salient thinking model.
We interpret the properties as follows. Every category contains some alternative
for every reference point. If a particular product, say x, belongs to the category k,
then so do all products that are close enough to x. There is a path that stays within
the category between any two points, so categories cannot be the union of “islands.”
Almost every alternative is in at least one category, and none are in two categories.
Finally, if the reference point does not change too much, then neither do the categories.
2Recall that a set A is regular open if A = int(cl(A)).
3That is, each Kk is both upper and lower hemicontinuous when viewed as a correspondence.
8The consumer values each good in a way that depends not only on alternative of
a product, as in the standard neoclassical model, but also on the category to which
the product belongs. When alternatives x and y are both categorized in category k,
the category utility function Uk : X → R represents the DM’s choices. That is, she
prefers x to y if and only if Uk(x) ≥ Uk(y). We focus on the effect of categorization
on distorting trade-offs, so we require that a category utility function is additively
separable and monotonic: Uk(x) = ∑ni=1 Uki (xi) where each Uki (·) is strictly monotone
and continuous.4 The utility index Uki represents the DM’s preferences over dimension
i when an alternative belongs to the category k.
When alternatives belong to different categories, the reference point may affect
the DM’s choice. If the alternative x lies in the category k when the reference is r, that
is, x ∈ Kk(r), then the value of consumption x is represented by Uk(x|r). However,
the reference does not affect the utility trade-off within a category. To capture this, we
require that Uk(·|r) agrees with Uk, in the sense that it is an increasing transformation
thereof. Then, Uk(x|r) ≥ Uk(y|r) if and only if Uk(x|r′) ≥ Uk(y|r′) for any references
r, r′ ∈ X. We can now formally define the model as follows.
Definition 2. The family {%r}r∈X conforms to the Categorical Thinking Model (CTM)
under category function K = (K1, K2, . . . , Km) if for each category k there is a category
utility function Uk so that when x ∈ Kk(r) and y ∈ K l(r) for some r
x %r y ⇐⇒ Uk(x|r) ≥ U l(y|r)
and Uk(·|r) is an increasing transformation of Uk(·) for each r ∈ X and category k.
A CTM is increasing if Uki is increasing in xi for every category k and dimension i.
We also consider two sub-classes: A CTM is affine if Uk(·|r) an affine transformation
of Uk for each r. A CTM is strong if Uk(·|r) = Uk(·) for each r. Most of the models we
discuss below are affine CTM, and those of riskless consumer choice are all increasing.
4That is, Uki is either strictly increasing on R+ or strictly decreasing on R+.
92.2. Riskless Consumer Choice. In this subsection, we consider our primary appli-
cation: riskless consumer choice. The four models are introduced formally, and each is
shown to be CTM. Figure 1 plots their indifference curves and categories, with darker
lines indicating higher utility.
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Figure 1. CTM for Riskless Choice
Salient Thinking Model (BGS): Bordalo et al. [2013] propose an intuitive and
descriptive behavioral model based on salience. In the model, an attribute receives
more weight when it is salient than when it is not. The magnitude of salience is
determined by a salience function, σ := R++ × R++ → R+. Given a reference (r1, r2),
attribute 1 is salient for good x if σ(x1, r1) > σ(x2, r2), and attribute 2 is salient for
good x if σ(x1, r1) < σ(x2, r2).5 That is, the salient attribute is the one that differs the
most from the reference according to the salience function.
5We describe the properties of σ more fully in Section 4.
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Definition 3. The family {%r}r∈X has a BGS (σ;w1, w2, u1, u2) representation if each
%r is represented by
(1) VBGS(x|r) =
 w
1
1u1(x1) + w12u2(x2) if σ(x1, r1) > σ(x2, r2)
w21u1(x1) + w22u2(x2) if σ(x2, r2) > σ(x1, r1)
for a salience function σ, strictly positive weights with w
1
1
w21
>
w21
w21
, and each ui strictly
increasing.
To illustrate this model, consider the salience function proposed by BGS:
σ(xk, rk) =
|xk − rk|
xk + rk
.
Based on it, the left-upper panel in Figure 1 illustrates BGS. There are two categories:
those that are 1-salient, i.e. σ(x1, r1) > σ(x2, r2), and those that are 2-salient, i.e.
σ(x2, r2) > σ(x1, r1). To visualize them, note that the entire product space is divided
into four distinct areas by the two dashed curves that intersect at the reference point.
The areas lying the north and south of the reference point are categorized as the
2-salient products. Similarly, 1-salient products lie east and west of the reference
point. The figure incorporates indifference curves as well, holding fixed the reference
point. There are two potential sets of indifference curves, illustrated by dotted lines.
Depending on the category, one of the two is utilized to determine the DM’s choice.
When attribute 1 is salient, the steeper one becomes the indifference curve since it
puts higher weight on the first attribute. Conversely, the flatter one is the indifference
curves when attribute 2 is salient. We draw two different indifference curves, where
the darker color corresponds to higher utility.
Constant Loss Aversion Model (TK): Tversky & Kahneman [1991] provides
foundations for a reference-dependent model that extends Prospect Theory to riskless
consumption bundles. Each is evaluated relative to reference point r, and losses loom
larger than gains. In the absence of losses, the DM values each alternative with an
additive utility function, u(x1) − u(r1) + v(x2) − v(r2), which attaches equal weight
11
to each attribute. If she experiences a loss in attribute i, then she inflates the weight
attached to that attribute by λi > 1. There are four different categories in the TK
formulation: (i) gain in both dimensions, (ii) gain in the first dimension and loss in the
second dimension, (iii) loss in the first dimension and gain in the second dimension,
and (iv) loss in both dimensions (see the right-upper panel in Figure 1). We model
this as KGL = (K1, K2, K3, K4) where K1(r) = {x : x  r}, K2(r) = {x : x1 <
r1 and x2 > r2}, K3(r) = {x : x1 > r1 and x2 < r2}, and K4(r) = {x : x  r}; call
this the gain-loss category function. Then, the utility function is
VTK(x|r) =

u1(x1)− u1(r1) + u2(x2)− u2(r2) if x ∈ K1(r)
λ1(u1(x1)− u1(r1)) + u2(x2)− u2(r2) if x ∈ K2(r)
u1(x1)− u1(r1) + λ2(u2(x2)− u2(r2)) if x ∈ K3(r)
λ1(u1(x1)− u1(r1)) + λ2(u2(x2)− u2(r2)) if x ∈ K4(r)
where λ1, λ2 > 0 (> 1 if loss averse) and each ui strictly increasing. TK is a special
case of affine CTM with four categories defined by a gain-loss category function.
Status Quo Bias Model (MO): Masatlioglu & Ok [2005] model individuals who
experience some form of psychological discomfort when they have to abandon their
status quo option. This discomfort imposes an additional utility cost. Of course, if
an alternative is unambiguously superior to the status quo, the DM does not feel any
psychological discomfort to forgo the status quo; in such cases there will be no cost.
Formally, Q(r) is a closed set denoting the alternatives that are unambiguously superior
to the default option r (see the left-bottom panel of Figure 1). If an alternative does not
belong to this set, then the DM pays a cost c(r) > 0, which may depend on the reference
point, to move away from the status quo. In this model, there are two categories
KMO = (K1, K2) where K1(r) = {x| x ∈ int(Q(r))} and K2(r) = {x| x /∈ Q(r)}. For
any x 6= r, we have
VMO(x|r) =
 u1(x1) + u2(x2) if x ∈ K
1(r)
u1(x1) + u2(x2)− c(r) if x ∈ K2(r)
.
12
This is an example of an affine CTM for general c, and a strong CTM when c(r) is
constant.
Prototype Theory (PT): Prototype theory was first proposed by Posner & Keele
[1970]. According to it, each category is associated with a prototype, its “most typi-
cal” member. Initial categorization is determined by comparing each product to each
prototype. We now formalize this idea and show that this is CTM.
There are m prototypes, p1, . . . , pm. The DM categorizes alternatives according
to how similar they are to a given prototype. Then, category Ki(r) is the set of
alternatives categorized as most similar to exemplar pi. Similarity may depend on the
reference. There is a family of metrics indexed by r so that dr(x, y) indicates how far
away the DM perceives x to be from y given reference r. Formally, KP = (K1, . . . , Km)
where
Ki(r) = {x : i = arg min
j
dr(pj, x)}.
and the DM evaluates alternatives in category i according to
V iPT (x|r) = U(pi) + λi1(x1 − pi1) + λi2(x2 − pi2) if x ∈ Ki(r)
where U(·) is a hedonic utility function and λij > 0. A particularly interesting specifi-
cation is where λij = ∂∂pijU(p
i). Then, the DM approximates the utility of x according
to a first-order Taylor expansion around the prototype most similar to it (see the
right-bottom panel of Figure 1).6 This is an example of a Strong CTM.
2.3. Time Preferences. We apply our model to choices of dated rewards. The pair
(x, t) represents a payment of x at time t. Motivated by present bias, we propose
a model where the DM divides time periods according to short term and long term.
Given a reference r = (rx, rt), rewards arriving before rt are perceived as a short-term
and after rt as long-term. Hence
Kshort(r) = {(x, t)|t < rt}
6In the figure, we use dr(pj , x) = d(p
j ,x)
d(pj ,r) where d is the Euclidean metric.
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and
K long(r) = {(x, t)|t > rt}.
The utility function is
VQH((x, t)|(rx, rt)) =
 (βδ)
tu(x) if (x, t) ∈ Kshort(r)
βrtδtu(x) if (x, t) ∈ K long(r)
where 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < β ≤ 1. The model is additively separable after taking logs,
so it is a special case of CTM. It exhibits present bias when β < 1: there exist values
y > x > 0 so that the DM prefers (x, τ) %r (y, τ + 1) if and only if τ < rt − 1.7 Figure
2 plots its indifference curves.
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Figure 2. CTM for Dated Rewards
2.4. Social preferences. Our final application is to consumption allocations. Alter-
natives assign consumption to each of n agents, labeled 1, . . . , n. Dimension 1 corre-
sponds to the DM’s own consumption. We consider inequality-averse and social-welfare
concerned DMs.
Inequality Aversion: Fehr & Schmidt [1999] introduce a model of inequality aver-
sion. The DM experiences envy, i.e. she dislikes having a lower allocation than another,
7For instance u(x) = 1 and u(y) = (βδ)−1.
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and guilt, i.e. she prefers others not to have less consumption than her. We present a
generalization of their model where a reference point affects how much envy or guilt
the DM feels. Envy and guilt are generated by the difference between how much better
agent i is relative to i’s reference consumption and how much better the DM is rel-
ative to her own reference.Some reference-dependence makes sense when considering
decisions that impact the social alternative: the DM may not experience much guilt if
agent 2’s consumption is low in every feasible allocation.
In the Relative Inequality Aversion (RIA) model, the DM i feels guilty if her own
relative gain (xi−ri) is higher than the relative gain of individual j (xj−rj). Otherwise,
the individual i is jealous of individual j since xj − rj > xi − ri. Given the reference
point is r, the value function of the DM equals
V RIAi (x|r) =xi −
α
(n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
max{(xj − rj)− (xi − ri), 0}
− β(n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
max{(xi − ri)− (xj − rj), 0}
Observe that when ri = rj for all i and j, the utility function reduces to that of Fehr
& Schmidt [1999]. Throughout, we follow them in assuming that α ≥ β ≥ 0 and β < 1
We illustrate that this model is CTM by using the two-person version of it. With
two individuals, the category function can be written as KRIA = (K1R, K2R) where
K1R(r) = {x ∈ X : x1 − r1 > x2 − r2} and K2R(r) = {x ∈ X : x1 − r1 < x2 − r2}
The set KjR(r) contains allocations where individual j gets a relatively better deal than
the other. The relative inequality aversion model can be written as
V RIA1 (x|r) =
 x1 − α[(x1 − r1)− (x2 − r2)] if x ∈ K
1(r)
x1 − β[(x2 − r2)− (x1 − r1)] if x ∈ K2(r)
which is an affine CTM.
Distributional Preferences: Charness & Rabin [2002] propose a model of social
preferences where utility is increasing with the minimum of all individuals’ payoffs and
15
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Figure 3. Left: Relative Inequality Aversion and Right: Reference-
Dependent Distributional Preferences
the total of all individuals’ payoffs. The DM i maximizes
Vi(x) = (1− λ)xi + λ[δmin{x1, x2, ..., xn}+ (1− δ)
∑
k
xk].
The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of concern for helping the worst-off
individual (Rawlsian) versus maximizing the total social payoffs (Utilitarian). The
parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) measures how the DM balances social welfare with her own
utility, where λ = 0 captures pure self-interest.
We propose a natural extension of their model with an exogenously given reference
point. We call this model Reference-Dependent Distributional Preferences. That is,
V CRi (x|r) = (1− λ)xi + λ[δmin{x1 − r1, x2 − r2, ..., xn − rn}+ (1− δ)
∑
k
xk]
According this model, each individual cares to maximize the minimum possible relative
payoff xj − rj. Note that if ri = rj for all i and j, this model encompasses the model
of Charness & Rabin [2002] as a special case.
We show that this model is CTM. To do that, we first define categories for this
model. Each category corresponds to the individual who has the worst relative payoff.
In this case, KCR = (K1, . . . , Kn) where
Kj(r) = {x ∈ X : (xj − rj) is the minimum of {x1 − r1, x2 − r2, ..., xn − rn}},
16
and
V CRi (x|r) = (1− λ)xi + λ[δ(xj − rj) + (1− δ)
∑
k
xk] if x ∈ Kj(r),
showing that the model is an affine CTM.
3. Behavioral Foundation for CTM
In this section, we provide a set of behavioral postulates characterizing increasing
CTM. These postulates represents the key features of the model. We show that they
hold if and only if the data is representable by increasing CTM, rendering the model
behaviorally testable. In subsequent subsections, we explore the various strengthenings
of the model and provide axiomatizations of these as well.
For each category k, define the revealed ranking within that category %k so that
x %k y if and only if there exists r such that x, y ∈ Kk(r) and x %r y. The sub-relations
k and ∼k are defined in the usual way. The ranking %k captures preference within
category k. The following axiom states that the within-category revealed preference
has no cycles.
Axiom 1 (Weak Reference Irrelevance). The relation %k is acyclic. That is, if x1 %k
x2 %k · · · %k xm, then xm 6k x1.
Weak Reference Irrelevance ensures that the DM reacts consistently to alternatives
when they are categorized the same way. That is, the categories reflect the DM’s
psychological treatment of the alternative. Although she may have choice cycles, these
cycles occur only when the context changes how the DM categorizes alternatives. Since
%k is acyclic, we can take its transitive closure to derive full comparisons. Let %k∗ be
is transitive closure, with k∗ and ∼k∗ the asymmetric and symmetric parts.
Within a category, preference has an additive structure. The next axiom implies
that each %r satisfies Cancellation when restricted to a given category.
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Axiom 2 (Category Cancellation). For all x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2 ∈ R+, r ∈ X, and cate-
gory j so that (x1, z2), (z1, y2), (z1, x2), (y1, z2), (x1, x2), (y1, y2) ∈ Kj(r):
If (x1, z2) %r (z1, y2) and (z1, x2) %r (y1, z2), then (x1, x2) %r (y1, y2).
Category Cancellation adapts the well-known Cancellation axiom to our setting,
differing in its requirement that the alternatives belong to the same category. Without
the qualifiers on how alternatives are categorized, the axiom is a well-known necessary
condition for an additive representation that appears in Krantz et al. [1971] and Tversky
& Kahneman [1991], among others. If X has strictly more than two dimensions, then
we can replace it with the analog of P2 [Savage, 1954]; see Debreu [1959].8
The next axiom requires that Monotonicity holds between objects categorized the
same way.
Axiom 3 (Category Monotonicity (CM)). For any x, y, r ∈ X: if x ≥ y and x 6= y,
then y 6%k∗ x for any category k; in particular, if x, y ∈ Kk(r), then x r y.
Since both attributes are “goods” as opposed to “bads,” Monotonicity means that
if a product x contains more of some or all attributes, but no less of any, than another
product y, then x is preferred to y. The postulate requires that choice respects Mono-
tonicity for alternatives within the same category. However, it does not require that
this comparison holds when the goods belong to different categories, and we shall see
later that salience can distort comparisons enough to cause Monotonicity violations.
Finally, the family of preference relations is suitably continuous.
Axiom 4 (Category Continuity). For any r ∈ X and any x ∈ ⋃iKi(r), the sets
UCj(x) = {y ∈ Kj(r) : y r x} and LCj(x) = {y ∈ Kj(r) : x r y} are open.
8Formally, for any x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Kk(r) and subset of indexes E, if xi = x′i and yi = y′i for i ∈ E, xi = yi
and x′i = y′i for all i /∈ E, and x %r y, then x′ %r y′. This is implied by Category Monotonicity when
n = 2, so a stronger condition is necessary.
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Moreover, the set{
x ∈⋃
i
Ki(r) : UCj(x)
⋃
LCj(x) = Kj(r) and UCj(x) 6= Kj(r) and LCj(x) 6= Kj(r)
}
has an empty interior.
Category continuity adapts the usual continuity condition to apply only within
a category. It says that when y is preferred to x in a given context and y′ is close
enough to y, then y′ is also preferred to x, provided that y′ belongs to the same
category as y. The final condition requires that if an alternative x is neither better
than everything within category j nor worse than everything within category j, then
there exists something in category j that is as good as x, or as good as something
arbitrarily close to x. For such an x, the category must intersect almost all indifference
curves close to x’s since each category is almost connected.
Finally, we make a structural assumption.
Assumption (Structure). The category function K is such that for any category k, the
following sets are connected: Ek = ⋃r∈X Kk(r), {x ∈ Ek : xi = s} for all dimensions i
and scalars s, and {y ∈ Ek : x ∼k∗ y} for all x ∈ Ek.
The Structure Assumption is satisfied all the models we discussed in the previous
section. Indeed, Ek = Rn++ for every category in these models. These conditions
establish that the objects categorized in the same way have enough topological structure
so that “local” properties can be extended to global ones. Chateauneuf &Wakker [1993]
show that the structure assumption, applied to a single preference relation and domain,
is needed to guarantee that a local additive representation implies a global one.
Theorem 1. Assume the Structure Assumption holds. The family {%r}r∈X satisfies
Weak Reference Irrelevance, Category Cancellation, Category Monotonicity, and Cat-
egory Continuity for K if and only if it conforms to increasing CTM under K.
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Increasing CTM captures the behavior implied by the axioms, so we call Axioms
1-4 the CTM axioms. Taken together, they establish that the DM acts rationally when
restricting attention to alternatives categorized in the same way for a given reference
point. That is, CTM captures a DM who differs from the neoclassical model only when
alternatives are categorized differently. The theorem reveals that a number of other
reference dependent models have been studied by the literature fall outside the scope
of our analysis. For instance, Bhatia & Golman [2013], Munro & Sugden [2003], the
non-constant loss averse version of Tversky & Kahneman [1991], and the continuous
version of the salient thinking model (see online appendix of Bordalo et al. [2013]) all
violate weak reference irrelevance for any specification of the category function. We
provide the details in Appendix A.6.
We provide a brief outline of how the proof works, and all omitted proofs can be
found in the appendix. The axioms are sufficient for a “local” additive representation
of %r (and thus %k) on an open ball around each alternative within category k. The
Structure Assumption allows us to apply Theorem 2.2 of Chateauneuf & Wakker [1993]
to aggregate the local additive representation of %k into a global one. To do so, we must
establish that the global preference is complete, transitive, monotone, and continuous.
We establish these properties for preference within each category by showing that the
transitive closure of each %k is complete and suitably continuous. The remainder of
the proof shows that Categorical Continuity allows us to stitch the different within-
category representations together into an overall utility function.
3.1. Reweighting. In all of the models discussed in Section 2.2, the DM evaluates
the difference between alternatives categorized in the same way similarly. That is,
regardless of the category, the DM agrees on how much better a value of x versus
y is in dimension i. Categorization affects only how much weight she puts on each
dimension. This is captured by the following axiom.
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Axiom 5 (Reference Interlocking). For any a, b, a′, b′, x′, y′, x, y ∈ X and categories
k, j with x−i = a−i, y−i = b−i, x′−i = a′−i, y′−i = b′−i, xi = x′i, yi = y′i, ai = a′i, bi = b′i:
if x ∼k y, a %k b, and x′ ∼j y′, then it does not hold that b′ j a′.
The term “Reference Interlocking” comes from Tversky & Kahneman [1991]. If
each %k is complete, then their statement of it is equivalent given the other axioms.
Roughly, the DM agrees on the difference in utilities along a given dimension regard-
less of how an alternative is categorized. To interpret, observe that the first pair of
comparisons reveals that the difference between ai and bi exceeds that between xi and
yi when the alternatives belong to category k. For alternatives categorized in j, the
DM should not reveal the opposite ranking. We defer to the above paper for a detailed
discussion.
Theorem 2. Suppose that {%r}r∈X conforms to increasing CTM under K and each Ek
is connected. For each dimension i, there exist a utility index ui and a weight wki > 0
for each category k so that each category utility Uk is cardinally equivalent to one that
maps each x ∈ Ek to ∑iwki ui(xi) if and only if Reference Interlocking holds.
All of the models in Section 2.2 satisfy the axiom, and are thus special cases
of increasing CTM satisfying Reference Interlocking. For instance, differences in the
salient dimension of BGS receive higher weight, but the relative size of two given
differences in the same dimension is the same regardless of whether both are salient or
both are not. The axiom implies that the utility index within each category must be
the same, up to an increasing, affine transformation.
3.2. Behavioral Foundation for Affine CTM. In this section, we explore when an
affine CTM exists. That is, when is Uk(·|r) a positive affine transformation of Uk(·|r′)
for any r, r′? All of the models from Section 2.2 fall into this class.9
9For MO, this is true only when c(r) <∞.
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Unsurprisingly, the key restriction relative to CTM is that tradeoffs across cate-
gories are affine. As is usual, this is captured by a form of lineariry, or the “Indepen-
dence Axiom.” We require it to hold only when alternatives combined belong to the
same category, and adjust for the curvature of the utility index.
To state the key axiom, we define an operation ⊕k along similar lines as Ghirardato
et al. [2003]. For x, y ∈ R and a category k, 12x⊕ki 12y = z when there exists a, b such that
(xi, a−i) ∼k∗ (zi, b−i) and (zi, a−i) ∼k∗ (yi, b−i). If %k has an additive representation,
then 12U
k
i (x) + 12U
k
i (y) = Uki (z). Define ⊕k similarly for alternatives: 12x ⊕k 12y = z
if and only if zi = 12xi ⊕ki 12yi for each dimension i. Finally, define αx ⊕k (1 − α)y by
taking limits.10 We note that if Uki is linear, then αx⊕ki (1− α)y = αx+ (1− α)y.
Axiom 6 (Affine Across Categories (AAC)). For any r ∈ X, x, x′, αx ⊕j (1 − α)x′ ∈
Kj(r), and y, y′, αy⊕k (1−α)y′ ∈ Kk(r): if x %r y and x′ %r y′, then αx⊕j (1−α)x′ %r
αy ⊕k (1− α)y′.
This axiom is a natural adaptation of the linearity axiom, a close relative of the
independence axiom. If we strengthened Affine Across Categories to be stated using
the traditional linearity condition, then we would obtain a representation where each
Uk(·|r) is itself an affine function. Otherwise, it requires that the⊕k operation preserves
indifference.
The second axiom deals with a technical issue.
Axiom 7 (Unbounded). For any r ∈ X: if Kk(r) contains a sequence xn so that
Uk(xn) → ∞ (−∞), then for any x ∈ X there exists x∗ ∈ Kk(r) so that x∗ r x
(x r x∗).
We note that Uk is unique up to a positive affine transformation. Hence whenever
the utility of some sequence goes to infinity for some representation of %k, it must
10In general, αx⊕k (1−α)y need not exist. However, it does exist “locally,” which is all we require in
the proof. That is, if x ∈ Kk(r), then there exists an open set O with x ∈ O on which αy⊕k (1−α)z
exists for every α ∈ [0, 1] and y, z ∈ O.
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also converge to infinity for any other representation as well. While the axiom can be
stated in terms of primitives, we instead state it in terms of the Uk.11 It ensures that a
category containing alternatives whose utility goes to positive (negative) infinity must
contain an alternative better (worse) than any other given alternative. If it failed, then
no affine transformation of the category utility would represent the preference.
Theorem 3. Assume the Structure Assumption holds. Then, {%r}r∈X satisfies the
CTM axioms, Affine Across Categories, and Unbounded for K if and only if it conforms
to Affine Increasing CTM under K.
All the models discussed in Section 2 fall into the class of Affine CTM, so the
result reveals the behavior all have in common. Relative to CTM, Affine Across Cat-
egories imposes stronger requirements on how the DM relates alternatives in different
categories. Not only does the DM evaluate utility within a category using an addi-
tive function, but the additive structure persists across categories. Moreover, this aids
with interpreting utility differences. If every pair of categories contains alternatives
indifferent to one another, the entire representation is unique up to a common positive
affine transformation. We call the combination of Axioms 1-4 and 6-7 the Affine CTM
axioms.
3.3. Behavioral Foundation for Strong CTM. For a strong CTM, changing the
reference point does not reverse the ranking of two products unless it also changes their
categorization. The following axiom imposes this.
Axiom 8 (Reference Irrelevance). For any x, y, r, r′ ∈ X:
if x ∈ Kk(r)⋂Kk(r′) and y ∈ K l(r)⋂K l(r′), then x %r y if and only if x %r′ y.
For the general CTM, the reference point influences choice trough two channels:
the category to which it belongs and its valuation. The axiom eliminates the latter.
11 The statement in terms of primitives involves standard sequences and does not reveal key aspects
of behavior, so we instead present the simpler and easier to interpret one above. In special cases, this
is easy to do. For instance, if Uk is linear, then the axiom simply states that if Kk(r) is an unbounded
set, then the conclusion of the above axiom holds.
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When comparing two alternatives across different reference points, the DM’s relative
ranking does not change when neither’s category changes. This property greatly limits
the effect of the reference point. In fact, a sufficiently small change in the reference
never leads to a preference reversal.
Theorem 4. Assume the Structure Assumption holds and for any categories i, j and
any r ∈ X, there exists x ∈ Ki(r) and y ∈ Kj(r) with x ∼r y. Then, {%r}r∈X satisfies
the Affine CTM axioms and Reference Irrelevance for K if and only if conforms to
Strong, Increasing CTM under K.
Since BGS, MO, and PT are Strong CTM, Theorem 4 characterizes the behavior
they have in common. While the reference plays a role in categorization, it plays no
role in choice after categorization is taken into account. TK, which belongs to affine
CTM but not strong CTM, must therefore violate reference irrelevance.
3.4. Comparing Models of Riskless Choice. TK, BGS, MO, PT, and the neo-
classical model all conform to Affine CTM, so Theorems 1 and 3 describe the behavior
that they have in common. However, the analysis so far, as well as the functional
forms of the models, leaves open the question of what behavior distinguishes them.
Of course, they differ in how alternatives are categorized, but the models also reflect
distinct behavior within and across categories.
In addition to Reference Irrelevance, they are distinguished by whether they satisfy
two classic axioms: Monotonicity and Cancellation, the unrestricted versions of Cat-
egory Monotonicity and Category Cancellation.12 The first requires that a dominant
bundle is chosen, and the latter that an additive structure obtains. The representa-
tion theorem of Tversky & Kahneman [1991] imposes those two axioms in addition
to continuity. In Appendix A.8, we show that an affine CTM with a Gain-Loss cate-
gory function satisfies the two classic axioms and continuity if and only if it has a TK
representation. We provide a detailed examination of the BGS model in Section 4.
12The formal statements are obtained by dropping the requirement in those two axioms that the
alternatives belong to the same category.
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Table 1 compares the four models in terms of Reference Irrelevance, Monotonicity
and Cancellation, when BGS, TK, MO, and PT do not coincide with the neoclassical
model. Only the neoclassical model satisfies all conditions; none of the other four do.
On the one hand, BGS and PT satisfy Reference Irrelevance but violate Monotonicity
and Cancellation. On the other, TK maintains Monotonicity and Cancellation but
violates Reference Irrelevance. Finally, MO satisfies all but Cancellation.13
Neoclassical BGS TK MO PT
CTM 3 3 3 3 3
Monotonicity 3 7 3 3 7
Reference Irrelevance 3 3 7 314 3
Cancellation 3 7 3 7 7
Table 1. Comparisons of Models
We provide a plausible example violating the Cancellation axiom, and hence be-
havior inconsistent with TK. Then, we illustrate BGS can accommodate this example
even without requiring a shift in the reference point. While the example is one simple
test to distinguish BGS from TK, it is also powerful as it works for a fixed reference
point.
Example 1. Consider a consumer who visits the same wine bar regularly. The bar-
tender occasionally offers promotions. The customer prefers to pay $8 for a glass of
French Syrah rather than $2 for a glass of Australian Shiraz. At the same time, she
prefers to pay $2 for a bottle of water rather than $10 for the glass of French Syrah.
However, without any promotion in the store, she prefers paying $10 for Australian
Shiraz to paying $8 for water.
13Propositions 2 and 5 give the 3’s of the table for BGS and TK. It is routine to verify that MO
satisfies Monotonicity and Reference Irrelevance and the PT satisfies RI. We provide examples showing
the other properties are violated in Appendix A.5.
14Whenever c(r) = c(r′) for every r, r′ ∈ X.
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The behavior in this example is both intuitively and formally consistent with the
salient thinking model of BGS.15 Without any promotion, the consumer expects to pay
a high price for a relatively low quality selection. When choosing between Syrah or
Shiraz, the consumer focuses on the French wine’s sublime quality, and she is willing
to pay at least $6 more for it. When choosing between water and Syrah, the low price
of water stands out and she reveals that the gap between wine and water is less than
$8. However, when there is no promotion, she focuses again on the quality, and she is
willing to pay an additional $2 for even her less-preferred Australian Shiraz over water.
Notice that this explanation does not require that the reference points are different.
Since the consumer visits this bar regularly, intuitively, her reference point should be
fixed and stable.
3.5. Non-increasing CTM. For simplicity, we have so far focused on increasing
CTM. This is a desirable feature in consumer choice, but models of social prefer-
ence often violate this property. For instance, inequality-averse individual 1 prefers
to increase the allocation to individual 2 from x to y when she feels guilty but not
when she is envious. However, she always prefers increasing the allocation to 2 in an
allocation categorized as guilty, and to decrease in any categorized as envious. This
contradicts Category Montonicity, suggesting the following weakening.
Axiom (Consistent Preference within Category, CPC). For each category k, there
exists a set of attributes P k so that if xj ≥ yj for all j ∈ P k, yi ≥ xi for all i /∈ P k,
and x 6= y, then y 6%k∗ x.
The set P k contains the attributes for which an increase positively affects the
DM’s evaluation. CPC requires that the set of positive attributes in a category does
not depend on the reference point. For the two-person-RIA model, the set for the
15Implicitly, the example reveals that the quality of French Syrah is higher than Australian Shiraz
which is in turn higher than water. The numerical value of quality assigned to each beverage is irrele-
vant to the violation of Cancellation. For examples of qualities so that choice can be represented by the
BGS model, one can calculate that (−8, qfs) r (−2, qas), (−2, qw) r (−10, qfs) and (−10, qas) r
(−8, qw) for qfs = 8, qas = 6.9, qw = 5.1, and the reference point r = ( 12 (−10 + −8), 12 (qw + qas))
when w = 0.6.
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“guilty” category is {1, 2} since she strictly prefers increasing everyone’s allocation,
but the set for the “envious” one is {1} – she prefers more for herself but dislikes
others having even more. Note that CM is the special case of CPC where P k includes
every dimension for every category.
A CTM is characterized by all the properties of an increasing CTM, except where
CM is replaced by CPC. The proof is a straightforward generalization of earlier one,
so it is omitted.
4. BGS Model and Categories
The BGS model is intuitive, tractable, and accounts for a number of empirical
anomalies for the neoclassical model of choice. Despite its popularity, it can be difficult
to understand all of the implications of the BGS model. Its new components are
unobservable, and its functional form rather involved.
The first crucial step towards understanding the model is getting a handle on the
novel salience function that determines which attribute stands out for a given reference
point. While one can work out the implications of a particular salience function, this
exercise is not fruitful since the particular function that applies to a given agent is
unobservable. Moreover, it is not clear how the model changes when the underlying
salience function changes.
CTM provides a lens through which we can study the salience function. While it
influences which attribute is salient, the weight given to each attribute is independent
of its magnitude. Therefore, its role is simply to divide the domain into distinct
categories, each associated with a particular attribute being most salient. We study
the salience function by focusing on the properties of the categories it generates.
Categories are generated by a function s : R++ × R++ → R+ if x ∈ Ki(r) if and
only if s(xi, ri) > s(xj, rj) for all j 6= i. In the BGS model, categories are generated by
a salience function σ that must satisfy the following properties. First, it increases in
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contrast, i.e. for  > 0 and a > b, σ(a+ , b) > σ(a, b) and σ(a, b− ) > σ(a, b). Second,
it is continuous in both arguments. Third, it is symmetric, i.e. σ(a, b) = σ(b, a). Two
other properties are sometimes assumed: σ is Homogeneous of Degree Zero (HOD) if
for all α > 0, σ(αa, αb) = σ(a, b), and σ has diminishing sensitivity if for all  > 0 and
a, b > 0, σ(a+ , b+ ) ≤ σ(a, b).16 Finally, we always impose that the salience function
is grounded: σ(r, r) = σ(r′, r′) for all r, r′ ∈ X. This is an implication of HOD satisfied
by all of the specifications of which we are aware in the literature, and is a necessary
condition for an attribute to be salient only if it differs from the reference.
Consider the following properties of categories.
S0: (Basic) For any r ∈ X: K1(r)⋂K2(r) = ∅, K1(r)⋃K2(r) is dense in X,
K1, K2 are continuous at r, and K1(r), K2(r) are regular open sets.
S1: (Moderation) For any λ ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ X: if x ∈ Kk(r), yk = xk, and
y−k = λx−k + (1− λ)r−k, then y ∈ Kk(r).
S2: (Symmetry) If (a, b) ∈ Kk(c, d), then (c, d) ∈ Kk(a, b) and (b, a) ∈ K−k(d, c).
S3: (Transitivity) If (a1, a2) /∈ K2(r1, r2) and (a2, a3) /∈ K2(r2, r3) then (a1, a3) /∈
K2(r1, r3).
S4: (Difference) For any x, y, z with y 6= z, (x, y) ∈ K2(x, z) and (y, x) ∈ K1(z, x).
S5: (Diminishing Sensitivity) For any x, y,K1, K2,  > 0, if (x, y) /∈ K1(r1, r2),
then (x+ , y) /∈ K1(r1 + , r2).
S6: (Equal Salience) For any x, r ∈ X: if x1
r1
= x2
r2
or x1
r1
= r2
x2
, then x /∈ Kk(r) for
k = 1, 2.
The properties have natural interpretations. Any category function satisfies S0 by
definition; we include it for completeness. S1 indicates that making a bundle’s less
salient attribute closer to the reference point does not change the salience of the bundle.
That is, when x and y differ only in attribute l, and y is closer to the reference in that
attribute, if x is k-salient, then so is y. S2 requires that the same ranking is used for
16BGS require this inequality to hold strictly. However, this is not a desirable property. If σ is HOD
as they assume, then σ(r, r) = σ(αr, αr) = σ(r + , r + ) for α > 1 and  = (α − 1)r, violating their
definition of diminishing sensitivity.
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Figure 4. Properties S0-S6 Illustrated
each attribute. S3 adapts transitivity to the salience ranking. It says that if a1 stands
out more relative to r1 than a2 does to r2, and a2 stands out more relative to r2 than
a3 does to r3, then a1 stands out more relative to r1 than a3 does to r3. S4 says simply
that any difference stands out more than no difference. S5 implies that increasing both
the good and the reference by the same amount in the same dimension does not move
the good from one category to another. S6 reads that if every attribute of x differs
from the reference point by the same percentage, then none of the attributes stands
out. More formally, if the percentage difference between xk and rk is the same across
attributes, then x is not k-salient for any k ∈ {0, 1}.
Figure 4 provides examples satisfying some but not all of the properties. The
functions that generate them, as well as a verification that they satisfy the claimed
properties, can be found in Example 4 in the Appendix.
Theorem 5. The category function satisfies:
(1) S0-S4 if and only if there exists a salience function σ that generates them;
(2) S0-S5 if and only if the σ that generates it has diminishing sensitivity; and
(3) S0, S1, and S6 if and only if it satisfies S0-S6 if and only if the σ that
generates it is HOD. Any HOD salience function generates the same categories.
This theorem provides a characterization for BGS’s salience function.17 It trans-
lates the functional form assumptions on the salience function in terms properties on
17Theorem 5 relies on the full structure of R2 for the last two results, as noted in Footnote 1. Di-
minishing sensitivity and Homogeneity are both cardinal properties, and so are undefined without
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the salience categories. The most common specification of the salience function, HOD,
satisfies all of the above properties. Surprisingly, the result shows that there is a unique
category function satisfying these properties. Hence, any two HOD salience functions
lead to exactly the same behavior.
We now turn to the question of identifying the salience function from choice be-
havior alone. That is, given that we observe a family {%r}r∈X , can we identify which
alternatives have what salience?
Proposition 1. Suppose that {%r}r∈X has a BGS representation. Then, the weights,
utility indices, and salience function are uniquely identified from {%r}r∈X .
The proof provides an algorithm for this in general. We illustrate for the case where
u1 and u2 are linear. Fixing a reference point r, any alternative that differs only in
dimension i from r must be i-salient. Hence, we can identify the weights on dimensions
within each category from the slope of the indifference curve passing through that
alternative. Now, we can test whether y is 1-salient by seeing if the indifference curves
close to it are those generated by the weights for 1-salient alternatives. Varying y and
r allows identification of the salience function, and hence the categories.
In addition to the particular form of categories, BGS satisfies several properties
that distinguish it from other CTMs. The most general of these is Reference Irrelevance,
above, making BGS a strong CTM. The other follows.
Axiom 9 (Salient Dimension Overweighted, SDO). For any x, y, r, r′ ∈ X:
if x, y ∈ Kk(r) ∩K l(r′), x %r y, xl > yl, and yk > xk, then x r′ y.
This axiom requires that categories correspond to the dimension that gets the
most weight. That is, the DM is more willing to choose an alternative whose “best”
attribute is k when it is k-salient. To illustrate, consider alternatives x, y with x1 > y1
and y2 > x2. Because x is relatively strong in attribute 1, x should benefit more than
cardinal structure on X. Properties S0-S4 are defined. Subsequent results that rely on Theorem 5,
such as Propositions 2 and 3, remain true when imposing only S0-S4 in this setting.
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y from a focus on it. If x is chosen over y when attribute 2 stands out for both, then
this advantage in the first dimension is so strong that even a focus on the other one
does not offset it. Hence, the DM should surely choose x over y for sure when attribute
1 stands out for it.
Proposition 2. Assume that there exists x ∈ Kk(r) and y ∈ Kj(r) with x ∼r y for
any categories k, j and any r ∈ X. Then, the family {%r}r∈X satisfies the Affine
CTM axioms, Reference Interlocking, Reference Irrelevance, and Salient Dimension
Overweighted for a category function K satisfying S0-S5 if and only if it has a BGS
representation where σ has diminishing sensitivity.
This result characterizes the BGS model. It also provides guidance for comparing
it with other models in the CTM class (see Figure 1 and Table 1). By outlining the
model’s testable implications, the result provides guidance on how to design experi-
ments to test it.18
In their 2013 paper, BGS focus on a special case where the model is linear: w11 =
w22 = 1−w21 = 1−w12 > 12 and u1(x) = u2(x) = x. In an earlier version of this paper, we
show this model is characterized by strengthening Affine Across Categories to require
linearity and imposing a reflection axiom that requires permuting two alternatives and
the reference point in the same way not to reverse the DM’s choice between the two.19
Taken together Propositions 1 and 2 provide an outline for a fully subjective
axiomatization of a family of preferences with a BGS representation. Proposition 1
shows that we can reveal a category function from the family of preferences, provided
they have a representation. We check whether these revealed categories exist and
satisfy S0-S5. If so, then the axioms shown necessary by the second result apply with
this revealed category function.
18The assumption that alternatives indifferent to each other exist in each category for each reference
point is not strictly necessary. A sufficient condition for it to be necessary is that the utility indexes
are both unbounded above (or below).
19Formally, the first is that Affine Across Categories holds with ⊕k replaced by the usual + operation.
The second is that (a, b) %r1,r2 (c, d) if and only if (b, a) %r2,r1 (d, c). One can verify that these
additional assumptions imply that the ancillary assumption about indifference holds.
31
5. Choice Correspondence
In this section, the modeler observes only the DM’s choice from a finite subset of
choices and nothing more. A model consists of both a theory of reference formation and
a theory of choice given categorization. In this setting, we can jointly test the theory
of choice given categorization, categorization given reference, and reference formation.
We model reference formation via a reference generator, a map from finite subsets
of alternatives to reference points. We denote the reference generator A : 2S \ ∅ → X,
with the interpretation that A(S) is the reference point when the menu is S. Examples
include the BGS theory that A(S) is the average alternative, that A(S) is the median
bundle, that A(S) is the upper (or lower) bound of S, and the Köszegi & Rabin
[2006] theory that A(S) = c(S). If additional observable data on the choice context is
provided, then it is easy to extend our results to A being a function of that as well. For
instance MO theorize that the initial endowment e is observable and that A(S, e) = e,
and Bordalo et al. [2019] theorize that past histories h of consumption are available
and that A(S, h) is the average between the bundles in S and those in h.
Fixing a categorization function K and a reference generator A, let X be the set of
finite and non-empty subsets of X such that every alternative is categorized. Formally,
S ∈ X only if S ⊂ ⋃mi=1Ki(A(S)). We call these menus or categorized menus for short.
The requirement ensures that each alternative in the choice set belongs to a category
given the reference point A(S). We leave open how the DM chooses when alternatives
that are uncategorized belong to the choice set. By leaving the choice from this small
set of menus ambiguous, we can more clearly state the properties of choice implied by
the model.20
20One can, of course, extend the model to account for these choices. For instance, BGS hypothe-
size that these alternatives are evaluated according to their sum. Complications arise because the
uncategorized alternatives are “small:” its complement is open and dense, and moreover it has zero
measure.
32
We summarize the DM’s choices by a choice correspondence c : X ⇒ X with
c(S) ⊆ S and c(S) 6= ∅ for each S ∈ X . Adapted to this setting, the model has the
following representation.
Definition 4. The choice correspondence c conforms to Strong-CTM under (K, A) if
there exists a family of preference relations {%r}r∈X that conforms to Increasing Strong
CTM under K so that
c(S) =
{
x ∈ S : x %A(S) y for all y ∈ S
}
for every S ∈ X .
5.1. Reference point formation. Provided that the reference generator is responsive
enough to changes in the menu, there is the possibility of testing the properties required
by categorization on %r. One example of enough structure is that the reference point is
the average bundle. However, this is just one example. An even more general sufficient
condition is as follows.
Assumption. A function A is a generalized average if for any S = {x1, . . . , xm} ∈ X :
(i) the function x 7→ A([S \ {x1}]⋃{x}) is continuous at x1, and
(ii) for any  > 0 and any finite S ′ ∈ ⋃iKi(A(S)), there exists S∗ ∈ X so that
S∗ ⊃ S ⋃S ′, d (A (S∗) , A(S)) < , and for any x′ ∈ S∗ \ S ′, minx∈S d(x′, x) < 2.
Examples of generalized average reference include the average bundle
Aa(S) =
(∑
x∈S x1
|S| ,
∑
x∈S x2
|S|
)
,
the median value of each attribute, and a weighted average
Awa(S) =
(∑
x∈S w(x)x1∑
x∈S w(x)
,
∑
x∈S w(x)x2∑
x∈S w(x)
)
for any continuous weight function w : X → [a, b] with b > a > 0. We sometimes
impose the additional requirement that A(S) ∈ co(S) \ ext(S) for all non-singleton S;
if so, we call A a strong generalized average. The first and last of these examples satisfy
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this property. The supremum and infimum on their own are not weighted averages,
nor (necessarily) is the choice acclimating reference generator, c(S) = A(S).21
5.2. Behavioral Foundations for Strong-CTM. We now consider the behavior
by a DM who conforms to Strong-CTM for a given category function and reference
generator. To do so, we make use of our earlier analysis by revealing how the DM
evaluates alternatives categorized in a given way. When A(S) is a generalized average,
this provides enough structure to identify enough of the family to apply our earlier
analysis.
The main behavioral content comes from the choice correspondence equivalent of
Reference Irrelevance. To state it, we introduce the following definition and notation.
Definition 5. The alternative x in category k is indirectly revealed preferred to al-
ternative y in category j, written (x, k) %R (y, j), if there exists finite sequences of
pairs (xi, Si)ni=1 such that x = x1 ∈ Kk(A(S1)), y ∈ Kj(A(Sn))
⋂
Sn, and for each i:
xi ∈ c(Si), xi+1 ∈ Si, and xi+1 ∈ Kki(A(Si)) ∩Kki(A(Si+1)) for some ki.
We replace Reference Irrelevance with the following weakening of the Strong Axiom
of Revealed Preference (SARP).
Axiom (Category SARP). For any S ∈ X , if (x, k) %R (y, j), x ∈ Kk(A(S))⋂S,
y ∈ Kj(A(S))⋂S, and y ∈ c(S), then x ∈ c(S).
We first illustrate in a simple two menu setting, analogous to a test case for the
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Consider two menus S1 and S2 and two
chosen products x1 ∈ c(S1) and x2 ∈ c(S2) where both products are categorized in the
same way for both menus. For example, x1 is in category 1 for both menus, and x2
is in category 2 for both. The observation x1 ∈ c(S1) reveals that the valuation of x1
is at least as high as that of x2 when x1 belongs to the first category and x2 to the
second. Since the categorization of products does not change when the menu changes
21Recall supS = (maxx∈S x1,maxx∈S x2) and inf S is defined analogously.
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from S1 to S2, their relative valuation stays the same as well. Hence, if x2 is chosen
from S2, then x1 must be chosen too. Since neither products’ category has changed,
the DM should obey WARP for these two menus. However, the axiom leaves open the
possibility of a WARP violation when either is differentially categorized.
The axiom extends this logic to sequences of choices in much the same way that
SARP does to WARP. A finite sequence of choices, where the choice from the next
menu is available in the current one and has the same salience in both, does not lead
to a choice reversal. Since salience does not change along the sequence of choices, the
choices do not exhibit a reversal.
Category SARP limits the effect of unchosen alternatives. Modifying them can
alter the DM’s choice, but only insofar as changing them changes the reference point
and thus the salience of alternatives. It states that these unchosen options do not alter
the relative ranking of two alternatives, unless they change the region to which the
alternatives belong. That is, when comparing the same two alternatives in different
menus, the DM’s relative ranking does not change when neither’s salience changes.
This property greatly limits the effect of the reference point. In fact, a sufficiently
small change in the reference never leads to a preference reversal.
The remaining axioms are the natural generalizations to the choice correspondence
of Category Cancellation, Category Monotonicity, Category Continuity, Reference In-
terlocking, and Affine Across Categories. We denote these by appending a “*” to
distinguish from their reference-dependent-preference formulation. Appendix B.1 con-
tains their formal statement.
As before, we require some additional topological structure on the categories. For
a category k, let
ER,k = {x ∈ X : x ∈ Kk(A(S)), {x} = c(S)}
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and
Dk =
⋃
S∈X
{
Kk(A(S))
⋂
S
}
.
The generalization of the structure assumption is as follows.
Assumption (Revealed Structure). For any category k, ER,k is open, ER,k is dense in
Dk, and the following sets are connected: ER,k, {x ∈ ER,k : xj = s} for all dimensions
j and scalars s ∈ R, and {y ∈ ER,k : (x, k) ∼R (y, k)} for all x ∈ ER,k.
In addition to what was imposed by the Structure Assumption, we require that
almost all objects categorized in a category are chosen in some menu. This can be
weakened, but is typically satisfied by the models in which we are interested, such as
BGS.
We require one last assumption.
Axiom (Comparability Across Regions, CAR). If x ∈ ER,k, then for any j there exists
y ∈ ER,j so that (x, k) ∼R (y, j).
This is a version of the assumption we made for Strong CTM. It requires that
every alternative chosen when it belongs to category k is revealed to be equally good
to some other alternative when it is categorized in category j. With it, we can now
state the result.
Theorem 6. Assume that Revealed Structure and CAR hold and that A is a generalized
average. A choice correspondence c conforms to strong-CTM under (K, A) if and only if
c satisfies Category-SARP, Category Monotonicity*, Category Cancellation*, Category
Continuity*, and Affine Across Categories*.
The result is the counterpart of Theorem 4 with an endogenous reference point.
The behavior corresponding to categorization does not fundamentally change across
settings. As long as the DM reacts consistently when alternatives are categorized in
the same way, then we can represent her choices as categorical thinking where the
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reference point only affects how she categorizes each alternative. The key challenge in
the proof is to establish that the arguments we used to establish our earlier results still
hold. We adapt our earlier arguments to show that revealed preference within cate-
gory k is complete on ER,k. This relies on small changes in alternatives not changing
choice, a property implied by generalized average. Then, the remaining axioms estab-
lish that this within-category preference has an additive representation. CAR allows
us to extend across categories.
5.3. Behavioral Foundations for BGS. In this subsection, we provide a behavioral
foundation for BGS. The first step is to show that the Revealed Structure assumption
holds.
Lemma 1. If A is a strong generalized average, K satisfies S0, S1, and S4, and c
satisfies Category Montonicity*, then ER,k = R2++ for k = 1, 2.
Given the assumptions we have made so far, every alternative is chosen in some
menu when it is k-salient. Consequently, the revealed structure assumption must hold.
The result relies on the observation that the DM categorizes x as 1-salient when all
other available options have the same value in dimension 2 as x. If x has the highest
value in attribute 1 in such a choice set, then it must be chosen.
Now, we can apply Theorem 6 in combination with the insights gained from Propo-
sition 2 to understand the behavioral foundation of the BGS model.
Proposition 3. Assume that A is a strong generalized average and that CAR holds.
The choice correspondence c satisfies Category-SARP, Category Monotonicity*, Cat-
egory Cancellation*, Category Continuity*, Affine Across Categories*, Reference In-
terlocking*, and Salient Dimension Overweighted* for a category function K satisfying
S0-S5 if and only if c conforms to BGS where σ has diminishing sensitivity.
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This theorem lays out the behavioral postulates that characterize the BGS model
with endogenous reference point formation. Most importantly, it connects the (un-
observed) components of the model to observed choice behavior. Fundamentally, the
properties that Proposition 2 characterized the model in our first setting still character-
ize it. To do so, we note that Theorems 5 and 6 imply that there exists a Strong CTM
with categories generated by a salience function. We then establish that choice within
the k-salient alternatives overweights dimension k by using SDO and the structure of
regions.
Finally, we ask the question of whether the choice correspondence with an endoge-
nous reference point provides enough leverage to identify salience.
Proposition 4. Given that c conforms to BGS with a strong generalized average, the
categories are uniquely identified.
As with Propositions 1 and 2, Propositions 3 and 4 provide a roadmap for testing
BGS without a known salience function. However, it still requires that the reference
generator is a strong generalized average. Consequently, the axioms capture the full
testable implication of the model and allow for tight comparisons with other existing
work.
6. Related Literature
This paper provides a choice theoretic analysis of categorization. We apply this
model to highlight similarities and differences between a number of behavioral models
in the literature. As such, it is closely related to the literature which studies how
a reference point affects choices, (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman [1991], Munro & Sug-
den [2003], Sugden [2003], Masatlioglu & Ok [2005], Sagi [2006], Salant & Rubinstein
[2008], Apesteguia & Ballester [2009], Masatlioglu & Nakajima [2013], Masatlioglu &
Ok [2014], Dean, Kıbrıs, & Masatlioglu [2017]). The papers focus on an exogenous
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reference point, as in Section 3. While TK and MO are examples of CTM, the oth-
ers are not. Nonetheless, our analysis puts the models on an equal footing so their
implications can be compared.
We then extend the model to consider endogenous reference point formation. This
adopts the approach of a number of recent papers, e.g. Bodner & Prelec [1994],
Kivetz, Netzer, & Srinivasan [2004], Orhun [2009], Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer
[2012], Tserenjigmid [2015]. As in Section 5, the reference point is a function of the
context, and is identical for all feasible alternatives. Finally, Köszegi & Rabin [2006],
Ok, Ortoleva, & Riella [2015], Freeman [2017] and Kıbrıs et al. [2018] study models
where the endogenous reference point is determined by what the agent chooses, but is
otherwise independent of the choice set. This represents a very different approach to
reference formation, and our approach does not easily generalize to accommodate it.22
One of our key contributions is to provide an axiomatization of the salient thinking
model. Interpreting salience as arising from differential attention to attributes, CTM
has a close relationship with the literature studying how limited attention affects deci-
sion making. Masatlioglu et al. [2012] and Manzini & Mariotti [2014] study a DM who
has limited attention to the alternatives available. The DM maximizes a fixed prefer-
ence relation over the consideration set, a subset of the alternatives actually available.
In contrast, in CTM the DM the considers all available alternatives but maximizes a
preference relation distorted by her attention. Caplin & Dean [2015], de Oliveira et al.
[2017] and Ellis [2018] study a DM who has limited attention to information. In con-
trast to CTM, attention is chosen rationally to maximize ex ante utility, rather than
determined by the framing of the decision, and choice varies across states of the world.
The most related interpretation considers attributes as payoffs in a fixed state. In ad-
dition to choices varying across states, each alternative has the same weights on each
attribute, similar to Kőszegi & Szeidl [2013]. Taken together, these results highlight
the effects on behavior of different types of attention.
22Maltz [2017] is the only model of which we are aware that combines an exogenous reference point
with endogenous reference-point formation.
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While we argue in this paper that a number of prominent behavioral economic
models can be thought of as resulting from categorization, few papers in econom-
ics explicitly address categorization. Mullainathan [2002] provides a model of belief
updating and shows how categorization can generate non-Bayesian effects. Fryer &
Jackson [2008] introduce a categorical model of cognition where a decision maker cat-
egorizes her past experiences. Since the number of categories is limited, the decision
maker must group distinct experiences in the same category. In this model, prediction
is based on the prototype from the category which matches closely the current situa-
tion. Finally, Manzini & Mariotti [2012] introduce a two-stage decision-making model.
In the first stage, a decision maker eliminates some of alternatives based on their cat-
egories, and in the second stage she maximizes her preference among the alternatives
surviving after the first stage. Bordalo et al. [2019] provide a model of memory and
attention, where the context’s similarity to past consumption opportunities affects the
salience of the alternatives currently available. They show this leads to endogenous
categorization of the current opportunity set, and discuss the resulting implications for
choice.
The evolutionary psychology literature on categorization suggests a common ex-
planation for the effects shown to be captured by our model of categorization. That
literature stresses that categories evolved as cues to apply a particular mental process
in a given situation (see e.g. the review by Cosmides & Tooby [2013]). However, these
processes are often applied to situations different from their evolutionary purpose.
Boyer & Barrett [2015] explain, “The fact that some cognitive system is specialized
for a domain D does not entail that it invariably or exclusively handles D, nor does it
mean that the specialization cannot be co-opted for evolutionarily novel activities.” This
implies that systems used to evaluate categorized objects are miscalibrated from how
they would be more useful. For instance, New et al. [2007] documented that subjects
were quicker and more accurate in noticing changes involving animals than for those
involving vehicles, despite the latter’s much greater importance in modern life.
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Appendix A. Proofs and Extras from Sections 2 - 4
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. k∗ has open upper and lower contour sets in Ek.
Proof. Suppose x k∗ y. Then, there are x1, x2, . . . , xM ∈ Ek and r1, . . . , rM with
x1 = x and xM = y so that xj %rj xj+1 and xj, xj+1 ∈ Kk(rj). Let j > 0 be such that
Bj(xj), Bj(xj+1) ⊂ Kk(rj). Set  = min{j}j<M .
Now, xj k xj+1 for at least one j. Let m be the last index for which this is true.
Since B(xm), B(xm+1) ⊂ Kk(rm), Let 0 < ∗m <  be such that B2∗m(xm) is a subset
of {x : x rm xm+1}. Then, xm − ∗m k xm+1 and by definition of %k∗, it follows that
xm − ∗m k∗ y. Assume (IH) that there is 0 < ∗m−j <  so that xm−j − ∗m−j k∗ y.
Then, it is easy to see that
xm−j−1 k xm−j − ∗m−j
for j ≥ 0 using CM, weak order, and the construction of ∗m−j. By Category Continuity
and Monotonicity, there then exists 0 < ∗m−j−1 <  so that xm−j−1 − ∗m−j−1 k
xm−j − ∗m−j. By (IH) and the definition of %k∗, it follows that xm−j−1− ∗m−j−1 k∗ y.
By induction, there is ∗1 so that x1 − ∗1 k∗ y, so by CM and definition of %k∗, we
have x′ k∗ y for any x′ ∈ B∗1(x). Conclude the upper-contour set is open; similar
arguments work for the lower-contour set. 
Lemma 3. %k∗ is complete on Ek.
Proof. Pick any x, y ∈ Ek and let E∗ = Ek ⋂Bd(x,y)+1(x). As the intersection of
two intersecting connected sets, E∗ is connected, and as a subset of Rn, there is a
continuous path θ : [0, 1] → E∗ so that θ(0) = x and θ(1) = y. This θ can be chosen
so that it crosses each %k∗ indifference curve at most once. To see why, suppose that
θ(a) ∼k∗ θ(b) and b > a. Since IC = {b′ ∈ E∗ : b′ ∼k∗ θ(a)} is path-connected, there is
another continuous path θ′ : [0, 1]→ IC with θ′(0) = θ(a) and θ′(1) = θ(b). Then the
path θ∗ given by θ∗(x) = θ(x) for x /∈ [a, b] and θ∗(x) = θ′
(
x−a
b−a
)
for x ∈ [a, b] is also a
continuous path from x to y. Constructing this for a∗ = min{a′ : θ(a′) ∼k∗ θ(a)} and
b∗ = max{a′ : θ(a′) ∼k∗ θ(a)} gives a path that crosses IC at most once. These are
well-defined since θ is continuous.
Now, let Y = θ−1([0, 1]). Y is closed since θ is continuous and so compact as a
subset of cl(Bd(x,y)+1(x)). For any z ∈ Y , there exists rz ∈ X and z > 0 so that
Bz = Bz(z) ⊂ Kk(rz). Since Bz ⊂ Kk(rz) and %k is a subrelation of %k∗, %k∗ is
complete and transitive when restricted to Bz. Then, the collection {Bz : z ∈ Y } is
an open cover of Y and hence has a finite subcover Bz1 , Bz2 , . . . , Bzm . W.L.O.G., Bzj
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is not a subset of Bzj′ for any j, j
′ and θ(zj) < θ(zj+1), so x ∈ Bz1 and y ∈ Bzm .
Moreover, since θ crosses each indifference curve only once, if zk k∗ zk+1 (zk ≺k∗ zk+1)
for any k, then zj %k∗ zj′ (zk -k∗ zk+1) for any j′ > j. W.L.O.G. consider the former.
Pick a1 ∈ Bz1
⋂
Bz2
⋂
Y so that x %k a1 and then pick aj ∈ Bzj ⋂Bzj+1 ⋂Y so that
aj−1 %k aj. Then,
x %k∗ a1 %k∗ a2 %∗ · · · %k∗ am %k∗ y.
Since %k∗ is transitive, we conclude x %k∗ y. Since x, y were arbitrary, %k∗ is complete.

Apply CW Theorem 2.2 to get an additive representation U i(x) on Ei. For any
x, y ∈ Ki(r), x %r y if and only if U i(x) ≥ U i(y) and U i(x) = ∑j U ij(xj).
Lemma 4. For categories Ki(r) and Kj(r), either (i) there exists xi ∈ Ki(r) and
xj ∈ Kj(r) so that xi ∼r xj; or (ii) xi r xj for all xi ∈ Ki(r) and xj ∈ Kj(r); or
(iii) xj r xi for all xi ∈ Ki(r) and xj ∈ Kj(r).
Proof. If neither (ii) nor (iii) holds, then after relabeling categories if necessary, there
exist x ∈ Ki(r) and y, z ∈ Kj(r) such that y r x r z. Let UCj(x) and LCj(x)
be the strict upper and lower contour sets of x in category j for reference r. Any
point in Kj(r) \ [UCj(x)⋃LCj(x)] is indifferent to x, so either (i) holds or the set
is empty. There exists an  > 0 such that for every x′ ∈ B(x), y r x′ r z by
Category Continuity and hence Kj(r) 6= Uj(x′) and Kj(r) 6= Lj(x′). By Category
Continuity, there exists x′ ∈ B(x) such thatKj(r)\[UCj(x′)⋃LCj(x′)] 6= ∅ (otherwise,
B(x) is contained in the interior of the set considered), so we can take y′ ∈ Kj(r) \
[UCj(x′)
⋃
LCj(x′)] and conclude y′ ∼r x′. 
Definition 6. A finite sequence (Q1, . . . , Qm+1) with each Qi ∈ {K1(r), . . . , Kn(r)} is
an indifference sequence for r (IS) if there exists x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym with xk ∈ Qk,
yk ∈ Qk+1 and xk ∼r yk.
We omit the dependence on r when clear from context.
Define the relation ./r by x ./r y if there exists an indifference sequence of cate-
gories (Q1, . . . , Qm) with x ∈ Q1 and y ∈ Qm. It is easy to see that ./r is an equivalence
relation (reflexive, symmetric, and transitive). Let [x]r denote the ./r equivalence class
of x.
Lemma 5. If y /∈ [x]r and x r y, then x′ r y′ for all x′ ∈ [x]r and y′ ∈ [y]r.
Proof. Fix x, y, r ∈ X with y /∈ [x]r and x r y, and assume x ∈ Kk. Pick any y′ ∈ [y]r.
By definition, there is an IS (Q1, . . . , Qm) with y′ ∈ Qm and y ∈ Q1. Let i = 1 and
y1 = y. If there exists y′′ ∈ Qi with y′′ %r x, then y′′ %r x r yi, so by Lemma 4,
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we can find z ∈ Qi and x′ ∈ Kk with z ∼r x′. If that occurs, then (Kk, Qi, . . . , Q1) is
an IS and y ∈ [x]r, a contradiction. Thus x r y′′ for all y′′ ∈ Qi. Now, there exists
yi+1 ∈ Qi+1 with x r yi+1 by transitivity and definition of IS. Hence, we can apply
above logic to Qi+1 as well: x r y′′ for all y′′ ∈ Qi+1. Inductively, this extends all the
way to Qm, so x r y′ in particular. Since y′ is arbitrary, this extends to any y′ ∈ [y]r.
Similar arguments show that x′ r y for any x′ ∈ [x]r. Combining, x′ r y′
whenever x′ ∈ [x]r and y′ ∈ [y]r. 
Fix a reference point r. Let A1, . . . , An be the distinct equivalence classes of ./r.
By Lemma 5, these sets can be completely ordered by r, i.e. Ai r Aj ⇐⇒ x r y
for all x ∈ Ai and y ∈ Aj. Label so that A1 r A2 r · · · r An.
Pick an indifference class Ai and an IS Q1, . . . , QM that contains points in every
region in Ai. We define Vi(·) on Ai as follows. Define Vi(x) on Q1 so that Vi(x) = U j(x)
for all x ∈ Kj(r) where Kj(r) = Q1. Clearly Vi represents r when restricted to Q1.
There is no loss in assuming that Vi is bounded, and the closure of its range is an
interval.23
Now, assume inductively that, for a given m ≤ k, Vi represents r when restricted
to ⋃m−1j=1 Qj ≡ Qm−1, is bounded, is continuous on Qm−1, and is an increasing trans-
formation of Uk within Qj when Qj = Kk(r). Then, extend Vi to Qm as follows. By
Lemma 5, it is impossible that y r x for every x ∈ Qm−1 and every y ∈ Qm. It will
be convenient to relabel regions so that Qm = Km(r).
Pick a bounded, strictly increasing, continuous h : R→ R. For any x ∈ Km(r) so
that x r y for all y ∈ Qm−1, set
Vi(x) = h(Um(x)) + β+
where
β+ = sup{Vi(x) : x ∈ Qm−1} − inf{h(Um(x)) : x ∈ Km(r), x r y for all y ∈ Qm−1}.
For any x ∈ Km(r) for which there exists y, y′ ∈ Qm−1 so that y r x r y′, let
Vi(x) = inf{Vi(y) : y ∈ Qm−1 and y %r x}.
For all other x ∈ Km(r), let
Vi(x) = h(Um(x)) + β−
where
β− = inf{Vi(x) : x ∈ Qm−1} − sup{h(Um(x)) : x ∈ Km(r), y r x for all y ∈ Qm−1}.
This Vi is bounded and continuous.
23We can define V ′(x) = h(V (x)) for h(v) = −1/(1 + v) when v ≥ 0 and h(v) = −2 + 1/(1− v) when
v < 0.
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We now show that it represents r on Qm. Pick x, y ∈ Qm. There are four cases:
Case 1: x, y ∈ Qm−1: then the claim follows by hypothesis.
Case 2: x ∈ Km(r) and either x r y′ for all y′ ∈ Qm−1 or y′ r x for all y′ ∈ Qm−1:
the claim is immediate.
Case 3: x ∈ Km(r) and y ∈ Qm−1: If y r x, then y −  r x for some  > 0 so
that y −  belongs to the same region as y. If y ∼r x, then Vi(y) ≥ Vi(x). If this does
not hold with equality, then there is a y′ ∈ Qm−1 so that y′ %r x and y r y′ (since
y′ 6%r y). But then y r x, a contradiction. If x r y but Vi(y) ≥ Vi(x), there exists
z ∈ Qm−1 so that Vi(z) ≤ Vi(y) and z %r x. But then by transitivity and hypothesis,
y %r z %r x.
Case 4: x, y ∈ Km(r) and Case 2 does not hold for either x or y: Suppose x %r y.
If not, then Vi(y) > Vi(x) so there exists a z ∈ Qm−1 so that z %r x and z 6%r y. By
weak order, y r z and so y r x, a contradiction.
Since it represents %r on Km(r), it also agrees with %m on Km(r). Hence it is an
increasing transformation of U i within Ki(r) for each i ≤ m. Renormalize Vi so that
its range is a subset of [−12 − i,−i].
For any x, y ∈ Ai, the above establishes that Vi(x) ≥ Vi(y) ⇐⇒ x %r y. For
any x ∈ Ai and y ∈ Aj where i < j, x r y by Lemma 5 and construction. Since
Vi(x) > −12− i, Vj(y) < −j, and −12− i > −j, we have Vi(x) > Vj(y). Define Uk(·|r) to
agree with the appropriate restriction of Vi, and conclude {r}r∈X conforms to CTM
under K. Since r was arbitrary, this completes the proof. 
A.2. Proof for Theorem 2. Sufficiency is easy to verify. Suppose that Uk(x) =∑n
i=1 U
k
i (xi). We show that for every category j there exists a vector w  0 so that
U j(x) = ∑ni=1wiUki (xi) represents j on Ek ⋂Ej.
Consider dimension 1, and the rest follow the same arguments. The goal is to
show that Uk1 (x)−Uk1 (y) ≥ Uk1 (a)−Uk1 (b) if and only if U j1 (x)−U j1 (y) ≥ U j1 (a)−U j1 (b)
for any x, y, a, b ∈ Ek1
⋂
Ej1. If this is the case, then standard uniqueness results give
that U j1 (x) = αUk1 (x) + β. The β can be dropped completing the claim.
Let pii be the projection onto the i-coordinate. Then, Ek1 = pi1(Ek) is open and
connected for any category k. This follows from Ek connected and open and pii con-
tinuous. In R, connected implies convex.
Claim 1. For any z ∈ Ek1
⋂
Ej1, there exists a neighborhood Oz = Bz(z) so that
Uk1 (x)− Uk1 (y) ≥ Uk1 (a)− Uk1 (b) if and only if U j1 (x)− U j1 (y) ≥ U j1 (a)− U j1 (b) for any
x, y, a, b ∈ Oz.
To see it is true, pick x ∈ Ek1
⋂
Ej1. Then there is an al ∈ El with al1 = x for
l = k, j. Let Uk−i(y) =
∑
j 6=i Ukj (yj) for any y ∈ X. Since each al ∈ K l(rl) for some
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rl ∈ X, there exists an l > 0 so that B2l(al) ⊂ K l(rl) ⊂ El, where the distance is
given by the supnorm. Pick  ∈ (0, l) so that
U l1(x+ )− U l1(x− ) < U l−1(al + l)− U l−1(al − l)
for l = k, j. Then, for any a, b ∈ [x−, x+] there exists ya−1, yb−1 so that (a, ya−1), (b, yb−1) ∈
B2k(ak) and (a, ya−1) ∼rk (b, yb−1) by Category Continuity and CM. In particular,
Uk1 (a) − Uk1 (b) = Uk−1(yb−1) − Uk−1(ya−1). For any a′, b′ ∈ [x − , x + ], it holds that
Uk1 (a) − Uk1 (b) ≥ Uk1 (a′) − Uk1 (b′) if and only if (b′, ya−1) %rk (a′, yb−1). Similarly,
there exist za−1, zb−1 so that (a, za−1), (b, zb−1) ∈ B2j(aj) and (a, za−1) ∼rj (b, zb−1). Now,
(b′, zb−1) %rj (a′, za−1) if and only if U j1 (a) − U j1 (b) ≥ U j1 (a′) − U j1 (b′). By Reference
Interlocking and weak order, (b′, zb−1) %rj (a′, za−1) if and only if (b′, ya−1) %rk (a′, yb−1),
so we conclude that the claim holds with x = .
We now extend to the entire domain (this follows similar arguments in CW). Pick
an arbitrary x∗ < x∗ ∈ Ek1
⋂
Ej1 and consider Z = (x∗, x∗]. If the claim is true, then
standard uniqueness results give that U j1 (x) = αUk1 (x) + β for all x ∈ Oz for some
α > 0. Let α∗, β∗ be the constants so that U j1 (x) = α∗Uk1 (x) + β∗ for all x in the
neighborhood of x∗, as guaranteed to exist by the claim.
Let
Z1 =
{
s ∈ Z : U j1 (x) = α∗Uk1 (x) + β∗ for all x ∈ (x∗, s]
}
.
Z1 is not empty by the claim. We show that it is both open and closed by picking
any s1 ∈ cl(Z1) and showing s1 ∈ int(Z1). Since [x∗, s1] is compact and O = {Oz :
z ∈ [x∗, s1]} is an open covering, there exists {O1, . . . , On} ⊂ O with x∗ ∈ O1, s1 ∈ On
and Om
⋂
Om′ = ∅ for all m′ ≥ m + 2. On each Om, there exists αm, βm so that the
utility indexes agree by the claim. Also, Om and Om+1 have non-empty intersections
with more than two points, so (αm+1, βm+1) = (αm, βm). In particular, O1 intersects
Ox∗ so αm = α∗ for all m. Then On
⋂
Z ⊂ Z1, i.e. s1 ∈ int(Z1), so cl(Z1) ⊂ int(Z1) ⊂
Z1 ⊂ cl(Z1), i.e. Z1 is both closed and open relative to Z. Conclude Z1 = Z since Z
connected.
Since U j1 (x) = αUk1 (x) + β for all x ∈ (x∗, x∗] for any interval in the domain, it
holds for the whole domain as well. Extend to other categories that intersect Ei1
⋃
Ej1
inductively. If there is no intersecting category, we can start again and obtain a (dis-
joint) interval, the values of U i1 (and U
j
1 ) on which have no bearing on the DM’s choices.
Similar arguments obtain for the other dimensions. Moreover, there is no loss in setting
each β = 0. This completes the proof. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3. To save notation, until after Lemma 10, we fix r and
write Kk instead of Kk(r) and % instead of %r. We also identify xαky with the
alternative αx ⊕k (1 − α)y. Let (U1, . . . , Un) be the additive functions that represent
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%1, . . . ,%n. Observe that Uk(xαky) = αUk(x) + (1−α)Uk(y) for any α, provided that
x, y, xαky ∈ Ek.
Recall from Definition 6 that an indifference sequence is a finite sequence of cate-
gories with indifference between each succeeding members.
Definition 7. The function v is a utility for the indifference sequence (Q1, . . . , Qm) if
v is an increasing additive utility function on each Qk and for all k, x, y ∈ Qk ⋃Qk+1:
x % y ⇐⇒ v(x) ≥ v(y).
Lemma 6. If xk ∈ Kk, xl ∈ K l, and xk ∼ xl, then there is a > 0, b ∈ R such that for
x ∈ Kk and y ∈ K l, x % y ⇐⇒ Uk(x) ≥ αU l(y) + β.
Proof. W.L.O.G., take Uk(xk) = 0. There is k > 0 such that B2k(xk) ⊂ Kk. By CM
and Category Continuity, there is l > 0 such that Bl(xl) ⊂ K l and for all y ∈ Bl(xl),
x∗ = xk+k  y  xk−k = x∗. For any y ∈ K l and α such that yαlxl ∈ Bl(xl), there
exists β ∈ (0, 1) such that x∗βkx∗ ∼ yαlxl by Category Continuity, CM, and that % is
a weak order. Let V l(y) = α−1Uk(x∗βkx∗). This is well defined, additive, increasing,
and ranks alternatives in the same way as U l. Thus, V l(y) = aU l(y)+ b for some a > 0
and b ∈ R.
For any x ∈ Kk and y ∈ K l, pick α ∈ [0, 1] such that xαkxk ∈ Bk(xk) and yαlxl ∈
Bl(xl). By construction, yαlxl ∼ y′ when y′ ∈ Bk(xk) and Uk(y′) = αVl(y). Thus,
xαkxk % y′ ∼ yαlxl holds if and only if Uk(x) ≥ Vl(y) and x % y ⇐⇒ xαkxk % yαlxl
by AAC since xk ∼ xl, completing the proof. 
For an indifference sequence (Q1, . . . , Qm) with utility v, we label the range of
utilities as cl(v(Qk)) = [lk, uk] where lk ≤ uk. Note that we allow Qk = Ql for k 6= l.
Lemma 7. For an indifference sequence (Q1, . . . , Qm), there is an affine, increasing
utility v for it.
Proof. The proof is by induction. We claim that there is a utility vk : X → R that
is a utility for the IS (Q1, . . . , Qk) for any k. When k = 1 or k = 2, this is true by
the above lemmas. The induction hypothesis (IH) is that the claim is true for k = N .
Consider k = N + 1. Let vN be the utility for (Q1, . . . , QN) be index that exists by the
IH. If QN+1 ⊆ ⋃Ni=1Qi, then we are done. If not, then for QN = K l, there is no loss
in normalizing vN so that it equals U l on K l(r). Suppose QN+1 = Kj(r), and let α, β
be the scalars claimed to exist by Lemma 6, so that U j(x) ≥ αU l(y) + β ⇐⇒ x %r y
for x ∈ Kk(r) and y ∈ K l(r). Restricted to QN , vN = U l, so we can define vN+1(x) =
αvN(x) + β if x ∈ ⋃Ni=1Qi and
vN+1(x) = U j(x)
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if x ∈ QN+1. Then, if l < N and x, y ∈ Ql ⋃Ql+1, then we are done by the IH, since
vN+1(x) ≥ vN+1(y) ⇐⇒ vN(x) ≥ vN(y). If x, y ∈ QN ⋃QN+1, then Lemma 6 and
construction implies the result. The claim then holds by induction. 
Lemma 8. Fix an indifference sequence (Q1, . . . , Qn) with utility v. If xk ∈ Qk for
k = i, i+1, i+2 with xi ∼ xi+1 ∼ xi+2, then (Q1, . . . , Qi, Qi+2, . . . , Qn) is an indifference
sequence (after relabeling) with utility v.
Proof. The Lemma is vacuously true for any 1 or 2-element IS. Fix an IS (Q1, . . . , Qn)
with n ≥ 3 and v as above, and suppose xk ∈ Qk for k = i, i+ 1, i+ 2 with xi ∼ xi+1 ∼
xi+2. By transitivity xi ∼ xi+2, so (Q1, . . . , Qi, Qi+2, . . . , Qn) is an IS; it remains to be
shown that v is a utility for it. There is an  > 0 s.t. B = B(v(xi)) ⊂ (lk, uk) for k =
i, i+1, i+2. Let v−1(u) : B → Qi+1 be an arbitrary point in Qi+1 such that v[v−1(u)] =
u. Now, fix x ∈ Qi and y ∈ Qi+2. For α small enough, v(xαixi), v(yαi+2xi+2) ∈ B.
Then xαixi ∼ v−1(v(xαixi)) and yαi+2xi+2 ∼ v−1(v(yαi+2xi+2)). So
x % y ⇐⇒ xαixi % yαi+2xi+2
⇐⇒ v−1(v(xαixi)) % v−1(v(yαi+2xi+2))
⇐⇒ v[v−1(v(xαixi))] ≥ v[v−1(v(yαi+2xi+2))]
⇐⇒ αv(x) + (1− α)v(xi) ≥ αv(y) + (1− α)v(xi+2)
⇐⇒ v(x) ≥ v(y)
This establishes the Lemma. 
Lemma 9. Fix an indifference sequence (Q1, . . . , Qn) with utility v. If (l1, u1)
⋂(ln, un) 6=
∅, then there exists i and xk ∈ Qk for k = i, i+ 1, i+ 2 with xi ∼ xi+1 ∼ xi+2.
Proof. If there is i with (li, ui)
⋂(li+2, ui+2) 6= ∅, then there is u ∈ ⋂j=i,i+1,i+2(lj, uj) so
there exists xj ∈ Qj with v(xj) = u for j = i, i + 1, i + 2 and thus by the hypothesis,
xi ∼ xi+1 ∼ xi+2. We show there exists such an i by contradiction. If li+2 > ui for all
i or li > ui+2 for all i, then (l1, u1)
⋂(ln, un) = ∅, a contradiction. So there must exist
i such that [li+2 > ui and li+2 > ui+4] or [ui+2 < li and ui+2 < li+4]. In the first case,
li+2 ∈ (li+1, ui+1)⋂(li+3, ui+3); in the second, ui+2 ∈ (li+1, ui+1)⋂(li+3, ui+3). In either
case, we have a contradiction. 
Lemma 10. Fix an indifference sequence (Q1, . . . , Qn) with utility v. Then for all
x, y ∈ ⋃iQi, x % y ⇐⇒ v(x) ≥ v(y).
Proof. This is clearly true if n = 1. (IH) Suppose the claim is true for any IS with
m < n elements. Fix an IS (Q1, . . . , Qn) with utility v. If x /∈ Q1⋃Qn or y /∈ Q1⋃Qn,
then the claim immediately follows from the IH, and clearly holds if x, y ∈ Qi for some
i. So it suffices to consider arbitrary x ∈ Q1 and y ∈ Qn. By Lemmas 8 and 9, if
(u1, l1)
⋂(ln, un) 6= ∅, we can form a shorter IS from Q1 to Qn and the claim then
follows from the IH.
52
There are two cases to consider: ln > u1 and un < l1. Consider ln > u1. The
range of v restricted to ⋃n−1i=1 Qi is dense in ⋃n−1i=1 (li, ui) = (l¯, u¯). Note ln ∈ (l¯, u¯) since
xn−1 ∼ yn, so (ln−1, un−1)⋂(ln, un) 6= ∅. Then (ln, v(y)) is an open interval having a
non-empty intersection with (l¯, u¯). Since the range of v is dense in (l¯, u¯), there exists
y′ ∈ Qn′ with ln < v(y′) < v(y). Since ln > u1, n′ > 1. Then (Q1, . . . , Qn′) and
(Qn′ , . . . , Qn) are both ISes with strictly less than n elements. Applying the IH, y′  x
and y  y′. Conclude using transitivity that y  x. Similar arguments obtain the
desired conclusion when un < l1. 
Define ./r as in the proof of Theorem 1, and let A1, . . . , An be the distinct indiffer-
ence classes of ./r. Again using Lemma 5, we can relabel so that x ∈ Ai and y ∈ Ai+1
implies x r y. By Lemma 10, there is vi on Ai so that vi is additive and increasing
within categories and x % y ⇐⇒ vi(x) ≥ vi(y) for all x, y ∈ Ai.
By Unbounded and Lemma 5, every positive unbounded region (if any) is a subset
of A1, and every negative unbounded region (if any) is a subset of An. If one region is
both positive and negative unbounded, then n = 1. Therefore, vi(Ai) is bounded for
all i ∈ (1, n), and vn(An) is bounded above whenever n > 1. Define V (x) = v1(x) for
all x ∈ A1. For x ∈ Ai with i > 1, define V (x) recursively by
V (x) = vi(x)− sup
y∈Ai
vi(y) + inf
y∈Ai−1
V (y)− 1.
Observe V (·) is a positive affine transformation of vi(·) when restricted to Ai, and if
x ∈ Ai, y ∈ Aj and i > j, then V (x) > V (y). Thus V represents %r and, when
restricted to any given region, is affine and increasing.
Defining Uk(·|r) as the (unique) affine transformation of Uk so it agrees with V
on Kk(r) establishes that %r is an affine CTM. Since r was arbitrary, this establishes
that each %r has such a representation. Conclude that {%r} conforms to Affine CTM,
completing the proof. 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4. Without loss of generality, normalize so that U1(·|r) =
U1(·|r′) for all r, r′. Suppose Uk(·|r) 6= Uk(·|r′) for some r, r′ and some k. Then, let
¯ = d(r, r′) and pick a sequence rˆn → rˆ such that: Uk(·|rˆn) 6= Uk(·|r), rˆn ∈ B¯(r) for
all n, and d(rˆn, r)→ inf{d(r′, r) : Uk(·|r) 6= Uk(·|r′)}. Since rˆn ∈ cl(B¯(r)), there is no
loss in assuming this sequence converges. Similarly, let rn be a sequence in B¯(r) such
that rn → rˆ and Uk(·|r) = Uk(·|rn).
By hypothesis and that each Kk(r) is open, there exists  > 0, xk and x1 such that
B2(xk) ⊂ Kk(rˆ), B2(x1) ⊂ K1(rˆ), and xk ∼rˆ x1. By continuity of the region functions,
B(xk) ⊆ Ki(rˆn) ∩ Ki(rn) and B(x1) ⊆ K1(rˆn) ∩ K1(rn) for n large enough. For z
close enough to xk, there exists y(z) ∈ B(x1) such that z ∼rˆ y(z). But then by SC,
z ∼rn y(z) and z ∼rˆn y(z). Thus Uk(z|rn) = U1(y(z)|rn) = U1(y(z)|rˆn) = Uk(z|rˆn) for
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all z close enough to xk, implying that Uk(·|rn) = Uk(·|rˆn), a contradiction. Conclude
Uk(·|r) = Uk(·|r′) for all r, r′. 
A.5. Examples from Table 1. Example 1 shows that BGS violates Cancellation and
inspecting Figure 1 shows it violates Monotonicity. It remains to show that TK violates
Reference Irrelevance and that MO violates Cancellation. This is established by the
following two examples.
Example 2 (TK violates Reference Irrelevance). Consider a TK model with λ1 =
λ2 = 2. Then, for r = (10, 10), x = (12, 12) and y = (9, 16), y %r x since (12 − 10) +
(12−10) = 2(9−10)+(16−10). For r′ = (11, 11), x r y since (12−11)+(12−11) >
2(9 − 11) + (16 − 11). But x ∈ RGL1 (r)
⋂
RGL1 (r′) and r ∈ RGL2 (r)
⋂
RGL2 (r′), so the
family violates Reference Irrelevance.
Example 3 (MO violates Cancellation). Let Q(r) = {x ∈ X : x1/2 + x2 > r1/2 + r2}
and c(r) = 1. Then, let x = (2, 1), y = (1, 2), z = (4, 4), and r = (0.9, 1.9). Since
(x1, z2) = (2, 4) %r (4, 2) = (z1, y2) and (z1, x2) = (4, 1) %r (1, 4) = (y1, z2) because all
four points belong to Q(r), cancellation requires that x %r y. However, x /∈ Q(r), so
y r x, so cancellation does not hold.
A.6. Other models and CTM. In this subsection, we present the functional forms
of the other models of salience we discussed, and show that they are not CTM.
• Gabaix [2014] assumes a rational DM would maximize u(a, w) but actually
maximizes
u (a, (w1m∗1, . . . , wnm∗n))
where
m∗ ∈ arg min
m∈[0,1]n
1
2
∑
i,j
(1−mi)Λij(1−mj) + κ
∑
i
mαi
where Λij incorporates the “variance” in the marginal utility of dimensions i
and j. When n is large, m∗i is often zero, so (w1m∗1, . . . , wnm∗n) is a “sparse”
vector.
• Tversky & Kahneman [1991] refer in general to
VCTK(x|r) =
∑
i
vi(ui(xi)− ui(ri))
where vi is concave above 0 and convex below
• Bordalo et al. [2019] and the continuous form of the salient thinking model has
VCBGS(x|r) = w(x1, r1)x1 + w(x2, r2)x2
where w has the same properties as a salience function.
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• Munro & Sugden [2003] use the functional from
VMS(x|r) = A(r)
(∑
i
γir
ρ−β
i x
β
i
) 1
β
• Bhatia & Golman [2013] assume that the DM chooses the bundle x that maxi-
mizes
U(x|r) = α1(r1)[V (x1)− V (r1)] + α2(r2)[V (x2)− V (r2)]
given that a reference point r, where each αi is increasing and positive.
The first fails to be CTM, as the indifference curves have the same slope every-
where for a fixed context. If they were CTM, then they would necessarily have only
a single region. Single region CTM coincides with the neoclassical model. The final
four explicitly take into account a reference point. In all four, it is easy to see that
the reference point affects the marginal rate of substitution between attributes. This
implies a violation of weak reference irrelevance for any given category function: any
two points in the same category that are indifferent to each other necessarily remain
so for a sufficiently small change in the reference point.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 2. K satisfying S0-S4 implies that E1 = E2 = Rn++, so
the structure assumption is satisfied. Moreover, Theorem 5 gives that the categories
are generated by a salience function. The axioms allow us to apply Theorems 2 and
4 to get a strong CTM representation of the family with reweighted utility indexes.
Hence,
Uk(x) = wk1u1(x1) + wk2u2(x2) + βk
for each x ∈ X.
There is no loss in normalizing so that β1 = 0. Pick x ∈ X with x1 > x2, and by
S4 observe that x ∈ K1(r) for r = (x1, x2/2) and x ∈ K2(r′) for r′ = (x1/2, x2). Since
K1(r) and K2(r′) are open, there exists  > 0 so that B(x) ⊂ K1(r)⋂K2(r). Since U1
is continuous and increasing, there is y ∈ B(x) with y1 < x1 so that U1(y) = U1(x),
i.e. y ∼r x; this y necessarily has y2 > x2 by CM. Then, SDO implies y r′ x, i.e.
U2(y) > U2(x), which requires w12/w22 < w11 > w21. We can incorporate β2 into u2 by
replacing it with u2 + β2/(w22 − w12) or into u1 by replacing β2 into u1 by replacing it
with u1 + β2/(w21 − w11). At least one does not involve dividing by zero, as otherwise
w2i = w1i for i = 1, 2. 
A.8. TK. This subsection states and proves a characterization theorem for TK.
Proposition 5. A family of preferences {%r}r∈X has a TK representation if and only
if it is an affine CTM with a gain-loss regional function that satisfies Reference Inter-
locking, Monotonicity, Cancellation, and continuity of each %r.
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Tversky & Kahneman [1991, p. 1053] provide an alternative axiomatic character-
ization of the model, and our result makes heavy use of their theorem.
Proof. Necessity follows from the discussion above and TK’s theorem. To show suffi-
ciency, we rely on TK’s theorem, which states that any monotone, continuous family
of preference relations that satisfies cancellation, sign-dependence and reference inter-
locking has a TK representation. Given our assumptions, we need to show that {%r}
satisfies sign-dependence and reference interlocking.
TK say that {%r} satisfies sign-dependence if “for any x, y, r, s ∈ X, x %r y ⇐⇒
x %s y whenever x and y belong to the same quadrant with respect to r and with
respect to s, and r and s belong to the same quadrant with respect to x and with
respect to y.” This happens if and only if x ∈ Kk(r)⋂Kk(s) and y ∈ Kk(r)⋂Kk(s)
for some k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, sign-dependence is exactly an implication of affine
CTM, since Uk(·|r) = αUk(·|s) + β for α > 0.
TK say that {%r} satisfies reference interlocking if “for any w,w′, x, x′, y, y′, z, z′
that belong to the same quadrant with respect to r as well as with respect to s,
w1 = w′1, x1 = x′1, y1 = y′1, z1 = z′1 and x2 = z2, w2 = y2, x′2 = z′2, w′2 = y′2, if w ∼r x,
y ∼r z, and w′ ∼s x′ then y′ ∼s z′.” The assumptions on quadrants imply that
w,w′, x, x′, y, y′, z, z′ ∈ Kk(r)⋂K l(s) for some k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Since y′, z′ ∈ K l(s),
the conclusion follows immediately from RI. 
A.9. Example 4.
Example 4. The following salience functions generates regions all satisfy S0-S3, but
only satisfy a subset of the other properties.
(1) The function σ(x, r) = max{x,r}2min{x,r} generates regions that violate S4-S6. Note
σ(a, a) = a for a > 0. Then (a, b + ), (a, b) ∈ K1(a, b) for all a > b and
small enough  > 0, contradicting S4 and S6, respectively. Also note σ(a, a) =
σ(
√
a, 1) for a > 0. Hence, (a,
√
a) /∈ K1(a, 1) but (a+ ,√a) ∈ K1(a+ , 1) for
every  > 0, violating S5.
(2) The function σ(x, r) = |x2− r2| generates regions that satisfy S0-S4 but violate
S5 and S6. Observe that (2,
√
5) /∈ K1(1,√2) since σ(2, 1) = σ(√5,√2) = 3,
but (2 + ,
√
5) ∈ K1(1 + ,√2) for any  > 0 since σ(2 + , 1 + ) = 3 + 2 > 3,
contradicting S5. It is routine to verify S4 by differentiating. Also, x = (2, 2)
and r = (4, 1) have x1x2 = r1r2, but σ(2, 4) > σ(2, 1) =, so x ∈ K1(r),
contradicting S6.
(3) The function σ(x, r) = |√x−√r| generates regions that satisfy S0-S5 but violate
S6. Also, x = (2, 2) and r = (4, 1) have x1x2 = r1r2, but σ(2, 4) > σ(2, 1), so
x ∈ K1(r), contradicting S6. Differentiating establishes S4 and S5.
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(4) The function σ(x, r) = max{x,r}min{x,r} generates regions that satisfy S0-S6.
A.10. Proof of Theorem 5. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 11. If K is a category function, then for any  > 0 and x so that B(x) ⊂
Ki(r), there exists δ > 0 so that B/2(x) ⊂ Ki(r′) for all r′ ∈ Bδ(r).
Proof. Let B/2(x). For each j 6= i, d(Kj(r), B) > /2, where d(·) is the Hausdorff
metric,24 and continuity of Kj implies that there exists a neighborhood Oj of r so
that d(Kj(r′), B) > /4 for all r′ ∈ Oj. Let O = ⋂j 6=iOj. Then, for any r′ ∈ O,
B /∈ cl(⋃j 6=iKj(r′)). Since cl(⋃iKi(r′)) = X, B ⊂ cl(Ki(r′)). But since B is open,
B ⊂ int(cl(Ki(r′))) = Ki(r′) since Ki(r′) is regular open. 
For sufficiency, define a binary relation S by (a, b)S(c, d) if and only if (a, c) /∈
K2(b, d). S is clearly complete. It is also transitive by S3. We show it has an open
contour sets. Let S∗ be the strict part of S. If (a, b)S∗(c, d), then x ∈ K1(r) for
x = (a, c) and r = (b, d). K1(r) is open by S0 so there exists  > 0 so that B(x) ⊂
K1(r). By Lemma 11, x ∈ K1(r′) for all r′ in a neighborhood O′ of r. Conclude
(a′, b′)S∗(c′, d′) for all (a′, b′), (c′, d′) ∈ B(x)×O′. Standard results then show existence
of a continuous function σ so that (a, b)S(c, d) if and only if σ(a, b) ≥ σ(c, d). σ is
symmetric by S2 and increasing in contrast by S1 and S4. Hence x ∈ K1(y) if and only
if σ(x1, y1) > σ(x2, y2), and by S2, x ∈ K2(y) if and only if y′ ∈ K1(x′) where x′, y′ are
the reflections of x, y. Hence, x ∈ K2(y) if and only if σ(x1, y1) < σ(x2, y2).
Pick any a, b. By S3, σ(a, b) = σ(b, a) so (a, b) /∈ K1(b, a) for any a, b. By S5,
(a+ , b) /∈ K1(b+ , a). Then, (b, a)S(a+ , b+ ) so σ(a, b) = σ(b, a) ≥ σ(a+ , b+ ).
Since a, b were arbitrary, diminishing sensitivity holds.
For necessity, verifying that S0-S5 hold are trivial, except that eachKi(r) is regular
open. To see this, pick r and x ∈ int(cl(K1(r))) (symmetric arguments hold for K2).
Suppose x r (the other cases follow by changing the signs). Then, there is  > 0 so
that x¯ = (x1 − , x2 + ) ∈ cl(K1(r)). Then, there exists x′ ∈ K1(r) that is arbitrarily
close to x¯, and we can take it so that r1 < x′1 < x1 and r2 < x′2 < x2. Then, σ(x1, r1) >
σ(x′1, r1) > σ(x′2,2 2) > σ(x2, r2) since σ is increasing in contrast. Hence x ∈ K1(r) and
since x was arbitrary, int(cl(K1(r))) ⊂ K1(r). Clearly, K1(r) ⊂ int(cl(K1(r))).
Now we show the following are equivalent:
(i) The functions K1 and K2 satisfy S0, S1, and S6,
(ii) There exists a salience function σ s.t. x ∈ Kk(r) ⇐⇒ σ(xk, rk) > σ(x−k, r−k)
24In this case it is actually a pseudo metric.
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That (ii) implies (i) follows from the first part, and that S6 is implied by sym-
metry and homogeneity of degree zero. Now, we show (i) implies (ii). Set σ(a, b) =
max{a/b, b/a}. Clearly σ is a salience function, and we show that σ generates K1 and
K2. Fix r ∈ X and set A = {x : σ(x1, r1) > σ(x2, r2)}. We show A = K1(r).
Claim A⋂K2(r) = ∅. If not, pick x ∈ A⋂K2(r). x ∈ A implies either (a)
x1/r1 > x2/r2 and x1/r1 > r2/x2 or (b) r1/x1 > x2/r2 and r1/x1 > r2/x2. If (a) and
x2 ≤ r2, then
x1/r1 > r2/x2 ≥ x2/r2 implies x1 > r1r2/x2 ≥ r1,
so there exists λ ∈ [0, 1) such that (λx1 + (1−λ)r1, x2) = (r1r2/x2, x2) = x′. If (a) and
x2 > r2, then
x1 > r1x2/r2 > r1,
so there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that (λx1 + (1 − λ)r1, x2) = (r1x2/r2, x2) = x′. By S1
and x ∈ K2(r), x′ ∈ K2(r). However, we have either x′1x′2 = r1r2 or x′1/x′2 = r1/r2 so
x′ /∈ K2(r) by S6, a contradiction. A similar contradiction obtains if (b) holds.
Now, since A⋂K2(r) = ∅ and K1(r)⋃K2(r) is dense, A ⊂ cl(K1(r)). By S0,
K1(r) = int(cl(K1(r)). Since A is an open set contained in cl(K1(r)), A ⊆ K1(r).
Similarly, for B = {x : σ(x1, r1) < σ(x2, r2)}, B ⊆ K2(r). But
(A
⋃
B)c = {x : x1x2 = r1r2 or x1/x2 = r1/r2},
and by S6, (A⋃B)c ⋂Kk(r) = ∅ for k = 1, 2. Thus A = K1(r) and B = K2(r),
completing the proof.
Finally, fix any HOD salience function s. Observe s(a, b) > s(c, d) if and only if
s(a/b, 1) > s(c/d, 1) by homogeneity if and only if s(max(a/b, b/a), 1) > s(max(c/d, d/c), 1)
by symmetry if and only if max(a/b, b/a) > max(c/d, d/c) by ordering. Thus if one
salience function generates the regions, every other salience function does as well. 
A.11. Proof of Proposition 1. Pick any r ∈ X. Observe that x = (r1 + k, r2) neces-
sarily belongs to K1(r) by S4, as does an open set O 3 x. This set O can be identified
by looking at whether Cancellation and Monotonicity hold on the set. By varying r
and k, we obtain a covering of the entirety of R2++ by points that necessarily belong
to the 1-salient region. This allows one to identify %1 and obtain a representation U1.
Repeating with x′ = (r1, r′2 + k) obtains a representation U2 of %2.
Fix any r ∈ X. Consider y  r and let
I∗(y) = {y′ : Uk(y′) = Uk(y) and U−k(y) 6= U−k(y′)} \ {y}.
If y ∈ Kk(r), then there exists y′ ∈ I∗(y) arbitrarily close to y so that y, y′ ∈ Kk(r); for
any such y′, y ∼r y′. If y′ 6∼r y for every y′ ∈ I∗(y)⋂B(y) for some  > 0, y /∈ Kk(r).
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Conclude y ∈ Kk(r) if and only if there exists y′ ∈ I∗(y) \ {y} arbitrarily close to y so
that y ∼r y′.
We now infer whether σ(x, a) > σ(y, b) for any x, y, a, b by considering whether
an alternative x′ is in K1(r) for appropriately chosen bundles so that x′  r. This
is impossible if x = a and always true if y = b and x 6= a. For any other values,
we have that σ(x, a) > σ(y, b) if and only if either (x, y) ∈ K1(a, b), x > a and
y > b; (x, b) ∈ K1(a, y), x > a, and b > y; (a, y) ∈ K1(x, b), x < a, and y > b; or
(a, b) ∈ K1(x, y), x < a, and b > y. In this way we can reveal the σ function and thus
the regions. 
Appendix B. Proofs and Extras from Section 5
B.1. Axioms for c. This subsection formally states the adaptations of the axioms
for reference dependent preferences {%r}r∈X in terms of the choice correspondence c.
Interpretation is identical to that of those axioms.
Axiom (Category Cancellation*). For all x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2 ∈ R++ and category k: if
(x1, z2) ∈ c(S1), (z1, y2) ∈ S1, (z1, x2) ∈ c(S2), (y1, z2) ∈ S2, (x1, x2), (y1, y2) ∈ S3 and
Si ⊂ Kk(A(Si)) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then (x1, x2) ∈ c(S3) whenever (y1, y2) ∈ c(S3).
Axiom (Category Monotonicity*). For any x, y ∈ X: if x ≥ y and x 6= y, then
(y, k) 6%R (x, k) for any category k.
Axiom (Category Continuity*). For any S ∈ X and any  > 0 so that E ⋂S\c(S) = ∅
where E ≡ ⋃x∈c(S) B(x) there exists δ > 0 so that if S ′ ∈ X , d(A(S ′), A(S)) < δ, and
for any y′ ∈ S ′, there is y ∈ S so that y′ ∈ Bδ(y), then c(S ′) ⊂ E whenever S ′⋂E 6= ∅.
Define %R,k by x %R,k y if and only if (x, k) %R (y, k). Using this relation, we can
define ⊕k for each category as we did with preference relations.
Axiom (Affine Across Categories*). For any S1, S2, S3 ∈ X , xi ∈ Kj(A(Si)), yi ∈
Kk(A(Si)) for i = 1, 2, 3, and any α ∈ (0, 1) so that (x3, j) %R (αx1 ⊕j (1 − α)x2, j)
and (αy1 ⊕k (1− α)y2, k) %R (y3, k):
if x1 ∈ c(S1) and x2 ∈ c(S2), then y3 /∈ c(S3).
Axiom (Salient Dimension Overvalued*). For x, y ∈ S ⋂S ′ with xk > yk and y−k >
x−k, if x, y ∈ Kk(A(S)), x, y ∈ R−k(A(S ′)), and y ∈ c(S), then x /∈ c(S ′).
Axiom (Reference Interlocking*). For any a, b, a′, b′, x′, y′, x, y ∈ X with x−i = a−i,
y−i = b−i, x′−i = a′−i, y′−i = b′−i, xi = x′i, yi = y′i, ai = a′i, bi = b′i:
if x ∼R∗k y, a %R∗k b, and x′ ∼R∗j y′, then it does not hold that b′ R∗j a′.
59
B.2. Proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 12. Assume that Revealed Structure holds, and that A is a generalized average.
If Category-SARP, Category Monotonicity*, Category Cancellation*, and Category
Continuity* hold, then for any category k there exists a Category utility Uk so that for
any x, y ∈ ER,k,
(x, k) %R (y, k) ⇐⇒ Uk(x) ≥ Uk(y).
Proof. Fix a category i and pick any x, y ∈ ER,i. Let E∗ = ER,i ⋂Bd(x,y)+1(x). As in
proof of Lemma 3, there is a continuous path θ : [0, 1] → E∗ so that θ(0) = x and
θ(1) = y that crosses each %R,i indifference curve at most once, and Y = θ−1([0, 1]) is
compact. We will show that for any z ∈ Y , there exists an open set z ∈ Bz ⊂ E∗ so
that %R,i is complete on Bz. If this is the case, we can mimic the rest of the proof of
Lemma 3 to show that either x %R,i y or y %R,i x.
By definition of E∗, for any z ∈ E∗, there exists S ∈ X with A(S) = r so that
c(S) = z. Since Ki(r) is open, there exists 1 > 0 so that B21(z) ⊂ Ki(r). By
Lemma 11, there exists 2 > 0 so that r′ ∈ B2(r) implies B1(z) ⊂ Ki(r′). Pick
ζ ∈ (0, 12) so that Bζ(z) ∩ S = z. By Category Continuity*, there exists 3 > 0 so
that for any S ′ ∈ X with d(A(S ′), A(S)) < 3, for any y′ ∈ S ′, there is y ∈ S so that
y′ ∈ B3(y), and S ′
⋂
Bζ(x) 6= ∅, then c(S ′) ⊂ Bζ(x). By Generalized Average, there
exists 4 > 0 so that z′ ∈ B4(z) implies d(A(S \ {z} ∪ {z′}), A(S)) < min{2, 3}/2.
Let ∗ = min{1, 2, 3, 4, ζ}.
Pick any x′, y′ ∈ B∗/4(z) and let z∗ = z − 12∗. Set S0 = S \ {z} ∪ {z∗}, not-
ing d(r, A(S0)) < 2/2. By Generalized Average, there exists S∗ with {x′, y′}⋃S0 ⊂
S∗ so that d(A(S∗), A(S0)) < ∗/2 and d(S0, S∗ \ [{x′, y′}⋃S0]) < (∗/2)2. Since
d(A(S∗), r) ≤ d(A(S∗), A(S0)) + d(A(S0), r) < 2, x′, y′ ∈ Ki(A(S∗)). Since every
member of S∗ is no more than ∗ away from a member of S, Category Continuity* im-
plies that c(S∗) ⊂ Bζ(z). CM* gives that either x′ ∈ c(S∗) or y′ ∈ c(S∗), so x′ %R,i y′
or y′ %R,i x′.
Continuity follows along the same lines as Lemma 2. CM* gives that it is also
monotone, and Category Cancellation* that it is locally additive. Apply Theorem 2.2
of Chateauneuf & Wakker [1993] to get a globally additive representation Uk. 
By Lemma 12, there exists a category utility Uk for each category. Since ER,k is
dense in Dk, we can extend Uk to Dk uniquely. By Generalized Average and Category
Continuity*, for any S ∈ X with z ∈ [Dk\ERk ]∩S, there is a z′ ∈ ER,k arbitrarily close
to z so that c(S) = c([S \ {z}] ∪ {z′}), so it is sufficient to establish a representation
when all alternatives categorized as k in S belong ER,k for each k and S.
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Fix two regions k and j. By CAR, for any x ∈ ER,k there exists x′ ∈ ER,k,
y ∈ ER,j, and S ∈ X so that x′, y ∈ c(S) and x ∼R,k x′. This implies there exists a
strictly increasing function H so that V (x|r) = Uk(x) when x ∈ Kk(r) and V (x|r) =
H(U j(x)) when x ∈ Kj(r) represents choice (when S ⊂ Kk ⋃Kj). This is well-defined
and represents choice by Category SARP. By AAC*, H is an affine function. The
argument are readily seen to extend inductively to all regions, which complete the
proof. 
B.3. Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any x ∈ X and set S = {x, x′} where x′ = (12x1, x2).
Then, A(S)2 = x2 by strong generalized average, so both x and x′ are 1-salient by S4.
By CM*, x ∈ c(S), and so x ⊂ ER,1. x was arbitrary, so X = ER,1. Similar for K2. 
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 1, the structure assumption is satisfied.
By Theorem 5, the category function is generated by a salience function. By Theorem
6, c conforms to Strong CTM. Mimicking the arguments of Theorem 2, Reference
Interlocking implies Uk(x) = wk1u1(x1) + wk2u2(x2) + βk. The rest follows from the
arguments that establish Proposition 2. 
B.5. Proof of Proposition 4. Pick any r, and suppose Uk(r) ≥ U−k(r). Since A is
a generalized average, for any y  r there exists a menu S so that A(S) is arbitrarily
close to r and y  x′ for all x′ ∈ S (pick S so its convex hull is in a small enough
neighborhood of r that doesn’t include y). By making that neighborhood smaller if
necessary, either y belongs to Kk(A(S)) or y /∈ Kk(r). There exists a y′ arbitrarily
close to, but not equal to, y, so that Uk(y′) = Uk(y) and U−k(y) 6= U−k(y′). In the
former case either y or y′ is chosen from the menu S ′ by categorical monotonicity*,
where S ′ is a menu (assumed to exist by generalized average) with A(S ′) sufficiently
close to A(S) and y, y′ ∈ S ′. Moreover, y′ ∈ c(S ′) if it is close enough that it too
belongs to Kk. Conclude that y ∈ Kk(r) implies that there exists y′ arbitrarily close
to, but not equal to, y with Uk(y′) = Uk(y) and {y, y′} = c(S ′). If y /∈ Kk(r), then
both y and y′ cannot be chosen. Either y is not chosen because it is in K−k, or the
DM will not be indifferent between y′ and y. The rest follows from Proposition 1. 
